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Since the collapse of the housing market, the prolonged economic uncertainty 
lingering in the U.S. economy has dampened restaurant performance. Economic 
uncertainty affects consumer sentiment and spending, turning into demand uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the highly competitive nature of the restaurant industry does not allow much 
room for restaurants to actively control prices, leaving most foodservice firms exposed to 
demand uncertainty. To investigate the impact of demand uncertainty in the restaurant 
industry, this study focused on the implications of demand uncertainty for investment.  
The first essay in chapter 3 examined the impact of demand uncertainty on 
investment and how the impact varies with industry-specific features: franchising and 
segment. The results showed that the investment rate decreases with the level of uncertainty 
and the association is nonlinear. That is, the investment drops more rapidly as the level of 
uncertainty increases. This study further revealed that there is no significant moderating 
effect of franchising on the uncertainty-investment relationship. When it comes to segment, 




The second essay in chapter 4 explored how managers cope with uncertainty when 
making investment decisions. In the absence of a clear imperative of what is efficient, 
managers are likely to scan other peers in the market and mimic their behavior. Focusing 
on this idea, it tested whether the investment is influenced by peers’ investment activities 
and whether peer-sensitive firms produce better investment outcomes. Consistent with the 
hypotheses, sample restaurant firms appeared to be affected by their peers in making 
investments. The results also indicate that uncertainty is a powerful force that leads firms 
to follow peers. In addition, it was seen that investment of peer-sensitive firms is not as 
effective as that of less-sensitive firms in growing market share.  
Lastly, the final piece of dissertation in chapter 5 analyzed the effectiveness of 
investment made under uncertainty. The findings indicate that a rise in investment in times 
of high uncertainty leads to a larger market share, suggesting that well-targeted investment 
can help firms turn crisis into opportunity to pull ahead of competitors who retreat in the 
face of uncertainty. However, increased depreciation costs and dwindling sales can hurt 









The prolonged economic uncertainty lingering in the U.S. has directly dampened 
restaurant performance (Gasparro, 2012a). The recent recession, caused by the collapse of 
the housing market, resulted in a chain-reaction that changed the business landscape. 
Although the National Bureau of Economic Research reported that the recession ended in 
2009, shadows of uncertainty in the housing market and government policy still loom over 
the economy, dragging down recovery (Izzo, 2010; McNabb, 2013; Morath & Hudson, 
2014; Zuckerman, 2014). When consumers feel insecure about their future income, their 
spending mirrors that attitude, translating economic uncertainty into demand uncertainty. 
Moreover, the instability and unpredictability inherent in consumer spending and 
preferences render demand uncertainty as the most obvious and significant source of 
uncertainty that cannot be eliminated (Arda & Hennet, 2006; March, 1978). Nevertheless, 
the highly competitive nature of the restaurant industry does not allow much room for 
restaurants to actively control price, leaving most foodservice firms acutely exposed to 
demand uncertainty (Gasparro, 2012a). Although the industry groans about demand 
uncertainty, not much is known about its impact on the restaurant industries unique 
business structure (Harrington, 2001).
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This dissertation focuses on the impact of demand uncertainty on investment as an 
attempt to address the need. Particularly, the current thesis investigates investment 
behavior and the effectiveness of investment made under uncertainty in the restaurant 
industry. As in other industries, investment is indispensable for the existence and growth 
of foodservice businesses. In 2012, the number of total restaurants increased by more than 
4,000 units in the United States (NPD, 2013). It is important to understand investment 
behavior because investment is directly linked to expansion and contraction not only at the 
firm level, but also at the industry level. 
The first essay investigates how restaurant firms coordinate their capital investment 
in the face of demand uncertainty. According to the real option theory, uncertainty restrains 
capital investment. Due to asset specificity, firms incur larger costs when they reverse 
investments than when they expand. Irreversibility and the resulting asymmetric 
adjustment costs of fixed assets increase with uncertainty, and accordingly uncertainty 
leads firms to postpone investment. Though demand uncertainty affects the entire 
restaurant industry, the degree of impact varies per conditions and resource positions of 
individual firms. Once the general impact of demand uncertainty is examined, conditional 
effects of restaurant industry-specific factors are tested. Two characteristics are chosen: 
franchising and segmentation. The findings will shed some light on how the unique features 
of the restaurant industry moderates the relationship of demand uncertainty to investment. 
The second essay explores the way restaurants cope with demand uncertainty when 
making investment decisions. More specifically, this study probes the effect that peers have 
on investment decisions. Traditional investment theories argue that investment decisions 
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should be based on marginal profitability of individual projects. However, limited human 
capacity to consider all the complexity and uncertainty in the entire set of alternatives and 
environmental constraints makes it difficult for managers to make rationally optimal 
decisions. Accordingly, individuals are naturally led to follow cues from successful 
competitors and imitate them. This will save time in terms of information search and 
computational cost and will provide legitimacy to their decisions (Banerjee, 1992; Conlisk, 
1980). Furthermore, a manager’s inclination to prevent the worst scenario of falling behind 
the average performance can also drive organizations to behave likewise, creating a 
competitive bandwagon pressure. Using this line of reasoning, the second essay examines 
the human-side of corporate management and whether a firm’s investment decisions are 
affected by those of its peers. If so, who imitates whom? What drives them to mimic others? 
What are the performance implications of investment of peer-sensitive firms? These are 
additional follow-up question explored in this section.   
Lastly, the final topic is geared towards the financial implications of investment 
made under demand uncertainty. As previously argued, a common approach taken by firms 
facing demand uncertainty is to delay or reduce investments. Whether this practice is a 
financially favorable choice is another issue that must be analyzed. Uncertainty can raise 
strategic value of an investment because the time when most firms retreat can be a chance 
to move forward. In hopes of drawing practical suggestions for managers agonizing over 
investment, this study will examine the effectiveness of investment under demand 
uncertainty. Fresh renovation of restaurants can give an edge over rivals and the 
effectiveness would be more pronounced when the competition clutter is reduced. 
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Nonetheless, if the financial status is fragile, taking more risks from converting liquid 
resources into irreversible assets may not be a desirable choice. It suggests that the 
effectiveness of investment in times of uncertainty should be carefully examined in 
consideration of the firm’s financial position.          
The findings will widen our understanding of how industry-based demand 
uncertainty shapes investment policies of restaurants and about the resulting performance 
implications. Investigating the interplay between demand uncertainty and characteristics 
of the foodservice industry infuses unique conditional effects into the general discussion 
on uncertainty and investment in corporate finance. In addition, the current thesis is 
expected to cast some light on the human factor of investment decisions, which has not 
attracted much attention from traditional investment literature. Investigation of the so-
called peer effect would suggest another piece of evidence for managers’ bounded 
rationality and thereby contribute to the literature on managerial decision-making. Lastly, 
but probably the most meaningful, the purpose of this thesis is to provide an opportunity 
for managers to ponder the theoretical implications and the performance consequences of 
investments made in times of uncertainty. 
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2.1 U.S. Economy and the Restaurant Industry 
2.1.1 Economic Cycles of the U.S. Over the Last Two Decade 
In 1994, the U.S. economy entered the recovery phase of the recession: GDP 
growth surged, new jobs were created every year, investment and consumption regained 
lost confidence. The unemployment rate that once was as high as 7.8 percent in 1992 fell 
to just over 4 percent for the first time since 1973, and 2.5million jobs were added to the 
economy each year since 1991 (Boehne,2000). Despite such dramatic expansion, inflation 
was not significant, which was partly due to an interest rate increase (from 3 percent to 6 
percent) by the Federal Reserve. It was also due to the production capacity that expanded 
rapidly commensurate to increasing demand. The financial crises in Asia lowered prices of 
commodities, including oil (Boehne, 2000).         
Another virtue of this prosperity was reduction in the budget deficit. The Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, were deficit reduction packages that included tax increases 
and spending cuts. This legislature allowed the federal government to turn a $290 billion 
deficit in 1992 into a $236 billion surplus in 2000 (Konigsberg, 2007; Peach, 2001). 
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According to the NBER, this is the longest economic expansion in the history of the United 
States, lasting ten years from 1991 to 2001.    
In mid-1990s, the rise of commercial growth of internet bred a number of internet 
companies (“dot-coms”). Combined with low interest rates in 1998-1999, substantial 
venture capital flowed into internet start-ups. Market confidence and aggressive investment 
in internet-based businesses led to the upsurge in equity prices. Between 1990 and mid-
2000, stock prices soared nearly fivefold, and the growth rate of equity prices accelerated 
from 10.4 percent per year between 1990 and 1995 to 21.2 percent per year between 1995 
and 2000 (Kraay & Ventura, 2007). Most dot-com companies, however, operated on losses 
in hopes of recouping their initial investment later. Nevertheless, many investors 
overlooked traditional evaluation measures, such as P/E ratio, and speculated on stocks 
starting with “e-” prefix. Promising companies made initial public offerings (IPO) and 
raised considerable funds even though they had never made any profit. Finally, the 
“irrational exuberance” burst in March 2000, which was followed by the early 2000’s 
recession.  
According to the NBER, the early 2000’s recession continued only for 8 months 
from March to November 2001. During this period, the September 11th attacks where 
Islamic terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center complexes and Pentagon occurred 
to bewilderment of the United States. Though the unheard-of attacks stirred global stock 
markets and consumer confidence, the direct aftermath to economy did not last for long. 
Timely action by the Federal Reserve, the City and State of New York, and the Federal 
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Emergency Management Agency kept the shock from turning into a financial crisis 
(Makinen, 2011).   
Low interest rates and an ease in the credit market stimulated investment and 
growth, which heated up the housing market in 2000’s. Nontraditional loans with fewer 
requirements for application were granted to buyers who would otherwise have not been 
qualified for traditional loans. Moreover, these loans required little or no down payment 
(Byun, 2010). Lax management of mortgages and speculative investment in residential 
structures finally came to an end in 2006 and 2007. Home prices, measured as Case-Shiller 
10-City Composite Home Price Index, plummeted from 226.29 in June 2006 to 150.44 in 
April 2009, a 33.5 percent decrease (http://us.spindices.com). A sharp decline of housing 
prices drove many homeowners into default on their mortgage payments in 2007. The U.S. 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were marketed in global markets, as they offered higher 
returns than U.S. government bonds. Accordingly, the subprime mortgage crisis brought 
about disastrous damage to most financial institutions that invested in MBS, including 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns, and further threw the global economy into a state of 
shock.  
The Great Recession is generally acknowledged as the most devastating and longest 
economic downturn since the Great Depression in 1930’s (Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, 
& Palma, 2009). In the U.S., 1.2 million jobs were eliminated from payrolls during the first 
10 months (Isidore, 2008), real GDP shrank 4.3 percent between late 2007 and mid-2009 
(Fieldhouse, 2014). Although its origins were American, the financial crisis had worldwide 
effects. A chain-reaction of recession spread throughout the world, in continents like 
8 
 
Europe, South America, and Asia. The financial crisis also inflated fears about public debt 
levels, leading to the sovereign debt crises in Greece and Ireland in 2010. 
The NBER defined the duration as December 2007 through June 2009, but the Wall 
Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that 57 percent of Americans still believe the 
economy was in depression (O’connor, 2014). Although the economy gradually recovered 
from the Great Recession, there are still difficult problems the U.S. economy should tackle. 
One of them is the unprecedented federal deficit. During 2000’s, federal spending sharply 
increased in areas of medical expenses, income security, and subsidies to individuals and 
businesses in need whereas tax revenue decreased (Wall Street Journal, 2010). 
 
2.1.2 Economic Cycles and the Restaurant Industry 
Figure 2.1 depicts historical returns of a market index (S&P Composite index) and 
sample restaurant stocks. Monthly stock return data were retrieved from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices and firms with the Standard Industrial Code of 5812 were used 
as sample. Observations with monthly return that exceeds 100 percent were excluded from 
the sample. The graph clearly shows cyclicality and larger volatility of restaurant firm 
performance in comparison to the market. Average foodservice company stock returns 




Figure 2.1 Historical returns of the market index and restaurant stocks 
 
Figure 2.2 shows demand uncertainty of the U.S. restaurant industry over the last 
two decades. The U.S. monthly retail sales of food services and drinking places were 
retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/retail/), and demand 
uncertainty was calculated using GARCH (1, 1), as specified later in Chapter 3. The graph 
reveals ups and downs of demand uncertainty in the industry and its negative association 
with the business cycle. Consistent with Bloom (2014), the uncertainty tends to rise in 
recessionary periods and subside in booming periods. The following subsections will 
examine the impact of economic changes upon the  













































































































Source: the U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/retail/)  
Monthly uncertainty is estimated using GARCH (1, 1) 
Figure 2.2 Historical demand uncertainty in the restaurant industry 
 
 Full-Service and Limited-Service Restaurants 
The performance of a restaurant business largely depends on the business cycle (Gu, 
1993). However, the impacts of economic changes on performance may not be the same 
between segments due to differing characteristics, in terms of styles of operation, menu 
items, target customers, and financial characteristics (Gu, 1996; Zheng, Farrish, & Wang, 
2013). 
Full-service restaurants target high-income customers. The average check for fine-
dining restaurants was $28.55 in 2013 and $13.75 for casual-dining brands, compared to 
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sophisticated atmosphere and experienced and committed employees are key factors 
driving sales. Due to the high price range, full-service restaurants are the first to feel a 
upcoming recession (Youn & Gu, 2009). Fine-dining restaurants especially suffered from 
slowing consumer spending and decreasing corporate travel and entertainment expenses 
(Liddle, 2009). Morton’s Restaurant Group closed three steakhouses and its revenue fell 
18.9 percent while in-store sales dropped 24.9 percent in 2008 and 2009 (Liddle, 2009). 
The good news is, however, that the full-service segment is the first to feel any economic 
blossoming. Full-service restaurant sales grew faster than limited-service restaurants in 
2011 and 2012.  During the early years of recovery when the unemployment rate was still 
high, upper-income classes increased their economic position faster than middle-income 
and low-income classes. Improved corporate spending also fuels quick recovery of the full-
service sector (Thorn, 2014). Patronage to fine-dining restaurants grew 4 percent in both 






Source: Calculated by the Economic Research Service, USDA, from various data sets 
from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov) 
Figure 2.3 Sales of meals and snacks away from home by type of outlet 
 
Compared to the full-service segment, the limited-service segment exhibits lower 
elasticity to economic ups and downs. Limited-service restaurants rely on massive sales 
volume to make up for low profit margin (Youn & Gu, 2009). The affordable menu prices 
appeal to price-sensitive consumers during times of recession. Zheng et al. (2013) observed 
that limited-service restaurant stocks are recession-proof and the segment stock index 
outperformed that of full-service segment and the S&P 500 index from 2005 to 2010. 
However, it also takes longer to enjoy growing demand in post-recession period. Quick 
service restaurants fell behind full service establishments in 2011-2012 but outpaced them 
in growth of sales and employment in 2013, aided by the declining unemployment rate and 





































































































Source: Calculated by the Economic Research Service, USDA, from various data sets 
from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov) 
Figure 2.4 Percentage of sales of meals and snacks away from home by type of outlet 
 
 Franchising and Nonfranchising Restaurants 
Franchising is a lucrative business model that yields relatively higher return on 
invested capital at lower risk (Koh, Lee, & Boo, 2009). In return for using the franchisor’s 
brand, operation system, and marketing programs, franchisees pay royalties. Since the 
marginal cost of sharing a brand with an additional unit is nearly zero, franchise royalty 
delivers enhanced profitability. Moreover, as it is proportional to unit sales as opposed to 
profits, franchisors can collect royalties as long as franchisees earn revenue. A franchising 
fee, which is relatively less volatile than cash flow streams from company-owned units, 
contributes to risk-reduction as well. While the operating loss of company-owned 
properties are transferred directly to the nonfranchisors’ bottom line, franchisors can still 





































































































revenue. A lower volatility of earnings leads to lower financial costs, including financial 
distress (Smith & Stulz, 1985), underinvestment (Bessembinder, 1991), and taxes (Graham 
& Rogers, 2002). 
Low operating leverage also works in favor for franchise firms in downturns. Non-
franchise firms that generate revenue from owned/leased properties should invest a 
substantial portion of their resources in fixed assets, which would increase the portion of 
fixed costs like depreciation and interest expenses. Since fixed costs do not vary with sales, 
even a small variation in sales has a snowball effect on the bottom line in firms with high 
operating leverage. Furthermore, Zhang (2005) argues that asymmetric adjustment costs 
and irreversibility of investment make assets-in-place riskier than growth options in bad 
times. During challenging economic times, firms try to dispose of their idle assets, but the 
high cost of disinvestment deprives them of adjustment flexibility, leaving them stuck with 
unproductive assets. Accordingly, the firms with larger fixed-asset holdings could be hit 
harder by economic meltdowns. On the contrary, franchise firms that hold relatively fewer 
corporate units have more buffer to adverse economic shocks, reducing their market risk 
exposure (Tuzel, 2010). Moreover, smaller asset size enhances profitability (e.g. ROA and 
ROI) and efficiency measures (e.g. sales turnover), which generally is a good sign 
according to analysts and investors. 
Figure 2.5 presents the average historical stock returns since 1991. As seen in the 
graph, the return of non-franchise restaurant equity exhibits greater fluctuation than that of 
franchise restaurants. Particularly, nonfranchisors are hit harder by downturns, showing a 
steep plunge at the trough of recessions. On the contrary, franchise stocks show a relatively 
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stable movement. They generally have a similar track record with the S&P Composite 
Index but sometimes show a bigger spike than the market index. In the 2000’s, franchise 
stocks outperformed the S&P most of the time, especially during the Great Recession. 
 
Figure 2.5 Yearly average stock returns 
 
Figure 2.6 presents the annual volatility of stock returns. As suggested by the 
trajectory of returns in Figure 2.5, nonfranchising firms have more significant fluctuations 
than franchise stocks and the market index. Whether it is a franchisor or not, restaurant 
stocks have a higher volatility than the market, and the gap tends to widen during a period 










































































































Figure 2.6 Yearly standard deviation of stock returns 
 
Aliouche, Kaen, and Schlentrich (2012) observed that franchise firms across all 
service industries outperformed the market benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis. Similarly, 
Hua and Dalbor (2013) revealed that restaurant franchisors yielded higher returns than 
nonfranchisors over the long term.  
    
2.2 Theory of Investment 
2.2.1 The q Theory 
According to the q theory of investment, suggested by Tobin (1969) and Tobin and 
Brainard (1977), the rate of investment is determined by the marginal q ratio, which is the 
market value of additional unit of capital stock to its replacement cost. The q investment 
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condition. The derivation comes from (Lewellen & Lewellen, 2013). The value of the firm 
can be expressed as below.  
                Vt = Π(𝐾𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝐶(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝜆𝑡) + 𝐸𝑡[𝑉𝑡+1]                              Eq. 2.1                                       
Π(𝐾𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) denotes profit as a function of the capital stock at the beginning of period 
(𝐾𝑡) and with a state variable (𝑠𝑡). 𝐼𝑡 is the investment and 𝐶(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡 , 𝜆𝑡) is the adjustment 
cost of investment, where 𝜆𝑡 is an exogenous stochastic parameter, e.g. technology shock.  
It is assumed that 𝛽 is constant and the exogenous variables 𝑠𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡 are Markov 
processes. Capital depreciates at a rate of δ, such that the capital at time t+1 is Kt+1 =
(1 − δ)Kt + 𝐼𝑡. The firm value can be rewritten as Vt = V(𝐾𝑡, 𝑠𝑡, 𝜆𝑡). Then the first-order 
condition for value maximization is  
                 1 + 𝐶𝐼(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝜆𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡[VK(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑡+1, 𝜆𝑡+1)                               Eq. 2.2                                        
𝐶𝐼 and 𝑉𝐾 are partial derivatives. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of investment and 
the right-hand side is the present value of an additional dollar of capital, which is the 
marginal q. The adjustment cost C is further assumed to be quadratic in 𝐼𝑡/𝐾𝑡. For instance, 
C = 0.5α(𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ − 𝜆𝑡)
2𝐾𝑡. The first-order derivative is CI = α(𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ − 𝜆𝑡). Plugging into 
(2) yields the following equation.   
                            𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ = − 1 𝛼⁄ + (1 𝛼⁄ )𝑞 + 𝜆𝑡                                        Eq. 2.3                                                     
Equation 2.3 implies that an individual firm’s value is maximized when investment 
is pushed until the marginal cost of investment is equal to the present value of an additional 
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dollar of capital. An individual firm’s stock price incorporates expectations of future 
variables that affect investment decisions. Thus, a firm’s share price should signal the 
correct level of investment to managers (Schaan, 2007). Simply put, there should be a direct 
relationship between the firm’s level of investment and the firm’s market valuation. 
Assuming that firms can freely adjust their capital stock, firms would increase or 
decrease capital stock until they reach the optimal q ratio of unity. A marginal q ratio 
greater than one stimulates investment whereas a ratio less than one deters investment. 
However, marginal q is usually not observable. Thus, average q, the ratio of market value 
of total existing capital stock to its replacement cost, is widely used in empirical studies as 
a proxy for marginal q. Hayashi (1982) derived a relationship between marginal and 
average q. If the firm is a price taker with constant returns to scale in both input and output 
markets, marginal q can be replaced by average q. However, if the firm is a price maker, 
then the average q is larger than the marginal q by the size of the monopoly rent.   
Unfortunately, despite its theoretical appeal, the q theory does not successfully 
explain corporate investment behavior in reality (Chirinko, 1993; Schaan, 2007). For 
example, investigating the response of investment to two stock market crashes in 1929 and 
1987, Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) argue that given fundamentals, market 
valuation plays a limited role in the determination of investment decisions. They observed 
that before and after the crash in 1929, firms adjusted investment to a greater extent than 
the level implied by market valuation, that is, firms increased investments less but 
decreased more than what was predicted by the theoretical relation between stock price and 
investment.  With regard to 1987, firms appeared to ignore market valuation. Chirinko 
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(1993) also notes low statistical significance of q and model fit in most recent empirical 
research. Moreover, the presence of significant serial correlation among residuals suggests 
a possible misspecification of the q model. He suggests two caveats behind the 
disappointing empirical power of q models. First, potential measurement errors 
surrounding components of average q. For instance, investment sentiment, such as fads, 
speculative bubbles, or excessive volatility, can create problems for q models. In addition, 
imperfect competition in the product market may distort the association between the 
shadow price of capital and the market value of the firm. In the presence of imperfect 
competition, the shadow price of capital is not equal to its market valuation anymore, 
leading to a discrepancy between marginal and average q.  
 
2.2.2 Capital Market Imperfections and Investment 
The q model previously described rests on the assumption of no financial frictions 
(Hubbard, 1998; Lewellen & Lewellen, 2013). However, if the firm faces financing 
constraints, cash flow can be important for investment decisions. Firms make investments 
through three financing sources: internal funds (cash flows), debt, and equity. According 
to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance theory, in a perfect capital market, where 
firms can freely get access to external capital at no cost, a firm’s investment is independent 
of its capital structure. Alternatively, the pecking order theory argues that internal funds 
and external funds are not perfect substitutes. Due to transaction costs associated with 
issuance of stock or bond and information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
investors, a premium wedge is created between the cost of internal and external capital. 
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Therefore, firms are likely to use the least expensive fund first, which is the internal fund, 
then liability and stockholders’ equity as a last resort (Myers, 1984). Moreover, shocks to 
current earnings may influence future net worth of the firm and thereby current credit 
conditions, which affects investment. Accordingly, if the internal funds run low, more 
financially constrained firms would find it more difficult to finance investments than less 
constrained firms, and thus should shrink or even forgo investment projects.  
Following such argument, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) reveal that cash 
flow and other cash-related measures can explain investment. More specifically, they show 
that investment is much more sensitive to fluctuations of cash flow in firms with a high 
earnings retention ratio and low dividend payout ratio, which are considered more 
financially constrained. The test model of FHP is as follows.  
    (𝐼 𝐾⁄ )𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾(𝐶𝐹 𝐾⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                   Eq. 2.4                                               
CF is cash flow, a proxy for changes in net worth of the firm.  
But for capital market frictions, 𝛾 would not be significantly different from zero 
given that investment opportunities are captured by Q. Subsequent studies have confirmed 
a significant role of cash flow in the q model for firms that are likely to resort on external 
funds (Bond & Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995; Hubbard, Kashyap, & 
Whited, 1995; Lewellen & Lewellen, 2013) 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) reexamined the low dividend paying group defined by 
FHP and reclassified the firms based on not only quantitative data but also qualitative facts 
from 10-K reports. They observe that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is lowest 
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in the most financially constrained group, contrary to the finding of FHP, and argue that 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a valid measure of financing constraints. 
However, their argument is limited due to several caveats. First, small sample size (49 
firms) and the concomitant insufficient heterogeneity among samples deters detection of 
meaningful differences. In addition, according to their sample-splitting criteria, the most 
constrained firms were actually financially distressed firms. Since the use of internal funds 
are usually restricted by creditors, the investment-cash flow sensitivity can be low in the 
most financially constrained firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 2000; Hubbard, 1998).  
The q model, which draws on the assumption of perfect capital market, may not be 
suitable in the presence of asymmetric information problems. This problem could be more 
serious in younger and low-dividend payout firms. As an attempt to address the problem, 
Hubbard et al. (1995) examined manufacturing firms’ investment and internal finance 
employing the Euler equation. As the Euler equation does not require measuring marginal 
q, it is less subjective to troubles stemming from inaccurate measurement of q. Their 
findings show that the standard neoclassical investment model based on the perfect capital 
market assumption works less satisfactorily for low-dividend payout (“more constrained”) 
firms than for high-dividend payout firms. They further demonstrate that the rejection of 
the standard investment model does not depend on size or maturity of the firm, implying 
that the effect of internal funds is not traceable to the free cash flow hypothesis suggested 
by (Jensen, 1986). Other studies yield similar results using the Euler equation (Bond & 
Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist, 1990; Whited, 1992).    
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Another possible explanation for the significant role of cash flow is that cash flow 
might measure investment opportunities better than q (Hubbard, 1998). Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) examine whether cash flow played a fundamental role in investment 
decision or simply predicted investment opportunities. To bypass the problems pertaining 
to the measurement of q, they developed an alternative proxy for the expected discounted 
marginal profit of investment (“Fundamental Q”) using the vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model. By adopting cash flow as one of explanatory variables for the Fundamental Q, they 
control the effect of cash flow as an indicator of investment opportunities. Consistent with 
FHP and subsequent empirical research, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) confirm cash 
flow is an important predictor of investment. They find that investment of firms with bond 
rating and access to commercial market papers are satisfactorily accounted for by the 
perfect capital market model of investment. In contrast, firms that have a limited access to 
external capital markets exhibit excessive sensitivity of investment to the volatility of cash 
flow.  
In summary, empirical studies of firm investments generally lend strong support 
for the links between changes in net worth and investment arising from information 
asymmetry in financial markets. 
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According to the contingency and resource dependency theories, organizations 
must be designed to cope with, and change to keep up with, the uncertainty of their 
environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Scott, 1981; Thompson, 1967). Therefore, 
uncertainty has received more attention in the literature than any other dimension of 
environment (Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1973; Khandwalla, 1977)  
The restaurant industry is highly sensitive to external economic factors (Enz, 2009; 
Neuman, 2009). As the restaurant business depends on consumer disposable income, the 
uncertainty over demand directly affects the restaurant performance. Nevertheless, 
academia has been silent about the impact of demand uncertainty in the restaurant business 
(Harrington, 2001). A strand of research on revenue management has suggested indirect 
ways to cope with demand fluctuation by maximizing revenue in a given situation, but 
other than that, much remains unexplored. Designed to fill the void in understanding how 
demand uncertainty affects restaurant businesses, this study examines the impact of 
demand uncertainty on restaurant investment. More specifically, it focuses on how 
restaurant firms facing uncertain demand adjust their fixed investment activity.
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3.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Uncertainty and Risk 
Risk and uncertainty are both related to the randomness of future outcomes. Though 
many researchers agree that they are not identical concepts, no unanimous definition has 
been made yet. Instead, the definitions are rather context or discipline dependent (Samson, 
Reneke, & Wiecek, 2009). According to Samson et al.’s (2009) review of multidisciplinary 
perspectives on uncertainty and risk, risk and uncertainty are either used interchangeably 
or distinguished from each other. Researchers who distinguish the two concepts seem to 
follow Willett’s (1901) early definition. He regards risk as the “objectified uncertainty 
regarding the occurrence of an undesirable event” and thus is quantifiable, whereas 
subjective uncertainty is “resulting from the imperfection of man’s knowledge.”  As 
uncertainty arises when imperfect knowledge makes it difficult to predict the future 
(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004), some scholars regard uncertainty as a state of 
the mind relying on subjective belief and knowledge (Pfeffer, 1956). Nevertheless, most 
studies that examine uncertainty and investment do not distinguish the two concepts and 
attempt to quantify uncertainty using observable data.  
 
3.2.2 Demand Uncertainty 
Demand uncertainty is the most obvious and significant source of uncertainty for 
most systems (Arda & Hennet, 2006). The instability and unpredictability inherent in 
consumer taste and preferences renders demand uncertainty a consistent source of 
ambiguity that cannot be eliminated (March, 1978). The restaurant is no exception. 
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Moreover, economic uncertainty takes a toll on restaurants (Gasparro, 2012a; Jargon, 
2013). Economic uncertainty affects consumer sentiment, translated into demand 
uncertainty. Highly intense competition in the foodservice market, however, does not allow 
much discretion for restaurants to actively control prices in response to uncertain demand. 
Nevertheless, it has not attracted much attention from hospitality management researchers 
(Harrington, 2001). Although a line of revenue management research has prescribed 
several ways for restaurants to maximize revenue in a given situation (Kimes, 1999; Kimes, 
Chase, Choi, Lee, & Ngonzi, 1998), their analysis is done at a micro-level for a particular 
restaurant unit rather than a macroscopic examination of the impact of demand uncertainty 
in the restaurant industry. 
This study investigates how restaurant firms adjust the level of investment in the 
presence of industry demand uncertainty. In addition, firm characteristics that affect a 
firm’s susceptibility to uncertainty will be explored as well. The findings will reveal what 
types of firms are more bound to industrial uncertainty when making investments.  
The match of industry-level uncertainty and firm-level investment data will better 
capture the causal relationship between uncertainty and investment because uncertainty in 
the industry is usually uncontrollable for most firms. A major problem of using firm-level 
uncertainty and investment data is endogeneity (Fuss & Vermeulen, 2008). When a firm 
starts an investment project whose profitability is unknown, it can increase the uncertainty 
of the firm. However, it is not reasonable to assume that a firm’s investment project would 
increase the industry’s uncertainty, particularly in a highly fragmented market like the 
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foodservice industry. The idiosyncratic impact of most restaurant firms’ investment policy 
on industry demand would be diffused at the industry level.   
 
3.2.3 Uncertainty and Investment 
 Theory 
The impact of uncertainty on corporate investment has long been researched in 
finance. According to one line of research, initiated by (Hartman, 1972) and (Abel, 1983), 
greater uncertainty increases investment. Assuming that the marginal revenue product of 
capital is convex in the output price, output price uncertainty can raise the marginal 
profitability of capital and thus increase investment. An increase in the variance of output 
price without a change in the mean raises the expected profitability of capital, leading to 
an increase in investment. This applies to firms that operate in competitive markets and 
have no problem in reversing investment with constant returns to scale.  
Caballero (1991) demonstrates how the association between uncertainty and 
investment changes according to different assumptions about marginal return to capital and 
adjustment cost. He argues that the positive association, claimed by Hartman (1972) and 
Abel (1983), is robust even to irreversible investment under the assumptions of perfect 
competition and nondecreasing returns to scale. He suggests that in a very competitive 
market, today’s investment decision only depends on the marginal profitability of capital. 
The asymmetry of adjustment cost has nothing to do with the sign of today’s investment. 
Thus, as long as the convexity of marginal return of capital with respect to price uncertainty 
holds, uncertainty encourages investment. However, when the adjustment cost asymmetry 
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is combined with decreasing marginal return to capital (because of imperfect competition 
or decreasing returns to scale), the association can turn negative. 
Another view, which emphasizes the role of irreversibility projects a negative 
relationship between uncertainty and investment. Once put into use, capital (or fixed) assets, 
such as plant and equipment, are hard to reverse to their former physical state without cost 
because the asset is likely to be tied to specific configuration requirements or contractual 
provisions of the firm, diminishing the reusable value of the asset. Accordingly, firms incur 
larger costs when they disinvest than when they expand. Because of the irreversibility of 
investment and asymmetric adjustment cost, Pindyck (1991) and Bernanke (1983) argue 
that firms unsure of future demand can benefit from delaying investment until the 
uncertainty at least partly dissolves away. Firms can make better-informed investment 
decisions by waiting for new information and reevaluating investment projects, implying 
a negative association between uncertainty and investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; 
Pindyck, 1991). Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck (1996) expand Pindyck (1991) and Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994) and consider a more general case. When investment is not necessarily 
irreversible, uncertainty increases both the value of waiting and the value of the reversing 
option, and thus the ultimate effect is not obvious. However, the effect would be negative 
as investment is more irreversible.  
 Empirical Evidence 
As investment decisions are forward-looking (Carruth, Dickerson, & Henley, 2000), 
uncertainty of any economic factor related with costs or return of the investment can impact 
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investment. Several sources of uncertainty have been examined, and the general consensus 
is that uncertainty has a negative effect on investment. 
Campa (1993) investigated the impact of exchange rate variability on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Because of sunk costs in capacity (i.e., the degree of irreversibility), FDI 
exhibits hysteresis effects, the phenomenon that the level of exchange rate at which a firm 
exits a foreign market does not come back to the level at which the firm first entered the 
market. For the firm to leave the market, the exchange rate should be lower than the level 
that induced entry. Consequently, firms would have an incentive to defer entry as the 
exchange rate becomes more volatile (Dixit, 1989). Campa (1993) empirically finds 
exchange rate volatility to be negatively related with the number of FDI, and the negative 
effect is more pronounced for industries where the extent of investment irreversibility is 
relatively high. Cushman (1988) observes that expected appreciation of the dollar is 
negatively correlated with foreign investment in the United States. However, Goldberg 
(1993) suggests a weak impact of the currency rate volatility on U.S. aggregate investment. 
The overall relationship is not significant and weakly positive in the manufacturing durable 
sectors. 
Huizinga (1993) examined inflation uncertainty and investment in the U.S. 
manufacturing sectors. Inflation uncertainty leads to uncertainty in real cost of production, 
such as real wages, as well as the uncertainty in relative price of final products and the 
profit rate, effecting uncertainty about real returns from investment projects. The empirical 
results show inconsistent associations of different types of uncertainties with aggregate 
investment. While uncertainty about real wage and output price induce a drop in investment, 
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uncertainty about the profit rate leads to increased capital expenditure. Byrne and Davis 
(2004) also found that inflation uncertainty has a depressant impact on investment, either 
the uncertainty is temporary or permanent. 
Rodrik (1991) demonstrates how perceived uncertainty about policy reforms acts 
as an implicit tax on investment. Uncertainty regarding the implications of a new policy 
freezes entrepreneurs’ investment sentiment, leading them to withhold projects until the 
uncertainty partially dissolves. Pástor and Veronesi (2013) argue that political uncertainty 
diminishes government protection for capital markets, raising the equity risk premium. The 
phenomenon is more significant in a fragile economy. Gulen and Ion (2016) also reveal a 
negative association of economic policy uncertainty and investment. They further show 
that policy uncertainty exerts a stronger impact on firms that operate in competitive 
industries and that are more financially constrained.  
Episcopos (1995) investigated the impact on fixed investment of five major 
uncertainty variables: the growth rates of real interest rate, consumer spending, composite 
index of leading indicators, stock price index, and GDP inflator. He also observed that the 
various proxy measures of economic uncertainty are inversely related to fixed investment.   
 Demand Uncertainty and Capital Investment in the Restaurant Industry 
Capital investment generally refers to investment in physical long-term assets (e.g. 
property, plant and equipment) that are utilized for production. Mergers and acquisitions 
are also regarded as a part of capital investment. Capital expenditure in restaurant 
businesses mostly involves development of new restaurants and improvement of existing 
properties. Other capital expenditures include investments in information technology 
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systems and production facilities. In terms of amount, the restaurant industry is placed in 
the middle between manufacturing and pure service-oriented industries. For example, the 
amount of capital expenditure by an average restaurant firm was $107K as of January 2014, 
whereas the same figure was $646K in the automotive industry, and $37K in the computer 
software industry (Damodaran, 2014). 
Capital investment in the restaurant industry bears a certain level of industry-
specificity and irreversibility. Under the U.S. GAAP, capital expenditure is capitalized and 
depreciated over the life of the asset, leading to an increase in operating leverage. Moreover, 
given that restaurant firms tend to finance their fixed assets through long-term debt (Jang 
& Ryu, 2006), making capital expenditures likely increases financial leverage as well. Thus, 
if future demand for new restaurants turns out to be insufficient to cover the investment 
expenditures, the restaurant firms would be burdened with idle capacity and debt. This 
suggests that restaurant chains would be reluctant to make capital investment as they see 
industry demand uncertainty increases.  
 Nonlinear Relationship Between Demand Uncertainty and Investment 
As previously argued, most empirical studies commonly report a negative 
relationship between uncertainty and investment, dominated by the concept of 
irreversibility of investment and real option (Pindyck, 1991). There are two common 
features in the aforementioned empirical research. One is that most of them focus on 
manufacturing industries (Koetse, de Groot, & Florax, 2009) and the other is that they 
implicitly assume a linear association. However, because of unique characteristics of the 
restaurant industry this study suspects a nonlinear relationship between demand uncertainty 
31 
 
and investment. That is, the negative impact of uncertainty may be insignificant or 
moderate for low levels of uncertainty but be more severe for high levels of uncertainty.  
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), individuals maintain an asymmetric 
attitude toward risks according to the size of loss. They observe a risk-seeking behavior 
over the domain of small losses when the utility of an agent depends on gains and losses 
rather than on the state of final outcomes. Thus, in the investment function derived from a 
nonlinear utility function, a firm may be willing to take risks for a range of small losses 
arising in the low level of uncertainty (Bo & Lensin, 2005).  
On top of that, the unique conditions of the restaurant industry provide additional 
support for a nonlinear relationship. Kulatilaca and Perotti (1998) argue that the impact of 
uncertainty on investment depends on the strategic value of investment, such as preemption 
and dissuasion of entry, and the value of not investing (the value of flexibility). As is well 
known, the restaurant industry is highly competitive. In the presence of competition, the 
impact of uncertainty between on investment depends not only on the degree of 
irreversibility but also on the value of strategic investment (Ghosal & Loungani, 1996). 
The real option theory claims that companies facing uncertainty are better off waiting 
before they make investment expenditures. This is because delaying allows the firm 
opportunities to reevaluate a project based on new information about price, costs, and other 
market conditions before committing resources (Pindyck, 1991). Such a claim implicitly 
assumes that the firm has an exclusive property right on the project that other firms cannot 
take over; however, that is not always guaranteed. When the firm shares growth 
opportunities with the firm’s rivals, the firm may need to invest quickly to preempt 
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investment by competitors or at least to maintain its competitiveness in the market. A 
myriad of research shows that the value of real options quickly deteriorates with 
competition (Baldursson, 1998; Bulan, Mayer, & Somerville, 2009; Grenadier, 1996, 2002; 
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Lambrecht & Perraudin, 2003). In line with this reasoning, 
Akdoğu and MacKay (2008) examine how industry competitiveness affects firms’ 
investment behavior. The results revealed that firms competing in oligopolistic and 
competitive industries show a larger investment-q sensitivity and a faster investment speed 
than firms in monopolistic industries.  
What makes capital investment risky under uncertainty is the irreversibility. Firms 
usually cannot disinvest or even if they can, the loss of time and value reduces the resale 
value of used capital far below its replacement cost (Ramey & Shapiro, 2001). The degree 
of irreversibility is one of the most obvious sources of heterogeneity in the relationship 
between uncertainty and investment (Koetse et al., 2009); the lower the cost to reverse the 
investment, the smaller the sensitivity of the investment to uncertainty. In manufacturing 
industries, capacity expansion is usually lumpy and requires a huge capital commitment 
and a years-long construction period. Moreover, the layout of a factory and equipment are 
specifically designed for and customized to what is produced. Thus, in 1981 Ford Motor 
Company had to close its gigantic Michigan Casting Center in Flat Rock built only 12 years 
previously at a cost of more than $150 million (New York Times, 1981; Tuzel, 2010). After 
more than three years of being closed, the plant was torn down so that another car maker 
Mazda Motor Manufacturing could construct a factory on the same site. However, the level 
of irreversibility is lower in the restaurant industry. As the investment is generally 
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undertaken on a unit restaurant basis, the capital investment can be split into a series of 
multiple projects. Furthermore, compared with building a new factory, opening a new 
restaurant can be done in a shorter time span with less cash. So does closing unprofitable 
units.   
Intense competition and relatively low disinvestment costs are restaurant industry-
specific features that work against the dampening impact of uncertainty. Thus, when 
uncertainty is low or moderate, those two factors, combined with human nature, which is 
generous to small losses, may dilute the inhibiting effect of demand uncertainty on 
investment. However, as uncertainty continues to increase, concerns about being stuck with 
unwanted equipment and loss-making outlets would discourage restaurant firms from 
making new investments. In other words, the investment rate falls slowly for low levels of 
uncertainty but it drops more rapidly as the level of uncertainty continues to go up.  
H1: As the level of demand uncertainty increases, the investment rate concavely 
decreases.  
 
3.2.4 Conditional Effects of Firm Characteristics 
Although industry-wide demand uncertainty affects entire firms in the market, not 
all firms would be affected to the same degree. Some firms may be more sensitive to macro 
uncertainties than others. The impact of demand uncertainty on investment is tested for, 
conditional on the following firm characteristics. The results would shed some light on the 




Next is an examination of the conditional effect of franchise on the relation between 
demand uncertainty and investment. Franchisors share business risk with franchisees as 
they rely on franchisees’ capital and human resources. By investing their resources, 
franchisees share the business risk with franchisors (Martin, 1988). The product of 
investment would be shared with franchisees as well. It is implemented through franchise 
fees, which are relatively more stable than operating income from company-owned outlets, 
and low operating leverage, which would dilute the effect of fluctuations in demand on the 
bottom line.   
Uncertainty dampens investment because of irreversibility inherent in investment, 
suggesting that the impact of uncertainty on investment is proportional to the extent of 
investment irreversibility. Thus, firms whose investment bears a larger sunk cost would be 
more sensitive to uncertainty shocks (Gulen & Ion, 2016). One of the proxy measures of 
irreversibility is a fixed asset ratio because fixed assets, such as property and equipment, 
are costly to reverse, and incur large sunk costs as a form of depreciation expense (Gulen 
& Ion, 2016). Franchising restaurants have a lower operating leverage than nonfranchisors 
(i.e., lower irreversibility of investment) as it is usually franchisees who own and manage 
units. 
Relatively stable cash flow obtained from franchise royalties is an important route 
that intervenes between uncertainty and investment. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) 
argue that the goal of risk management is to align the inflow of cash with the demand for 
investment funding. Imperfections of capital markets, such as information asymmetry 
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between managers and investors and default risk arising from debt, create a cost wedge 
between external capital (equity and debt) and internal fund (retained earnings). Thus, 
managers prefer internal funds to relatively expensive external funds in financing 
investment projects. They even forgo profitable projects when in-house capital is not 
sufficient. Indeed, it has been shown that investment is highly correlated with cash flow 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Hovakimian, 2009; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). Therefore, it is 
predicted that if a firm is concerned with its volatile cash flow stream, the firm would be 
cautious to make capital investments and it would be all the more so as the level of 
uncertainty rises. However, franchising firms, by securing a more stable cash flow stream, 
would be able to push forward investment projects as planned. This is the point where 
franchising can tackle the dampening impact of demand uncertainty on investment.  
H2a: Franchising restaurants are less susceptible to demand uncertainty in 
implementing investment projects than nonfranchising restaurants. 
 Segment 
As described in Chapter 2.1, the impacts of economic changes on performance 
differ between segments. Because of the high price range, full-service restaurants are the 
first to feel the onset of recession and the first to see the end of recession (Youn & Gu, 
2009). During the early years of recovery, when the unemployment rate is still high, the 
upper-income class increases their economic position faster than the middle-income and 
low-income classes (Thorn, 2014). In contrast, the limited-service segment exhibits lower 
cyclicality than the full-service segment. Limited-service restaurant stocks appear to be 
recession-proof and the segment stock index outperformed that of the full-service segment 
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and the market during the recent Great Recession. However, it also takes longer to benefit 
from increasing demand in the post-recession period.  
Less cyclical businesses have a greater temporal inertia (Steenkamp & Fang, 2011), 
which would offer a larger shield against the dampening effect of demand uncertainty. 
Conversely, highly cyclical businesses have to deal with sharp fluctuations in demand, and 
thus should be more cautious in making decisions that are fairly irreversible. In this regard, 
it is predicted that the full-service restaurants would be more susceptible to demand 
uncertainty than limited-service counterparts. 
H2b: Full-service restaurants are more susceptible to demand uncertainty in 




The U.S. monthly retail sales of food services and drinking places were retrieved 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/retail/). They provide seasonally 
adjusted monthly estimates of segmental (full-service, limited-service, and drinking places) 
as well as total sales since 1992. Firm accounting data were obtained from the Compustat 
database. Franchising data were manually collected from 10-K reports. Lastly, the annual 






 Estimating Demand Uncertainty in the Restaurant Industry 
In this study, a two-faceted measure of demand uncertainty based on historical 
industrial sales data was develped. First, uncertainty was estimate as the variance forecast 
of industry sales using a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model. It states that the best predictor of variance in the current period is the 
weighted sum of the long-run average variance, the variance predicted for the previous 
period, and the most recent squared residual, which is to reflect new information that 
arrived in the previous period so was not available when the previous forecast was made 
(Engle, 2001). 
 One feature of GARCH is that recent squared deviations are assigned larger 
weights than distant squared deviations and the weights gradually decline as observations 
recede in time (Ederington & Guan, 2006). Huizinga (1993) claims that what matters in 
investment decisions is not deviations from the average value that can be reliably predicted 
but rather fluctuations about an expected future trend, and that the use of an ARCH-based 
model fits the need for extracting unexpected shock from unconditional variance of a series. 
In the case of restaurant demand, the factors affecting restaurant sales are likely to 
be persistent over time. For example, critical to the success of restaurant businesses, 
economic conditions gradually shift. The U.S. economy has not yet completely overcome 
the Great Recession of the late 2000s. In addition, consumers’ preference shifts also tend 
to persist over a few years. For example, increasing demand toward healthy diet and 
sustainable businesses is expected to continue (Zwolak, 2010). What they imply in 
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common is that the variance of restaurant demand today, this month, or this year would be 
likely to resemble those of yesterday, last month, or last year. For these reasons, the demand 
uncertainty was estimated using a GARCH (1, 1) model. The variance forecast of demand 
would be a proxy measure for demand uncertainty.  
𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑡                                                     Eq. 3.1   
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                     Eq. 3.2   
This is the simplest but mostly widely used form of GARCH model, GARCH (1, 
1). The weights 𝛾0, 𝛾1, and 𝛿 determine the speed at which the forecast variance reflects 
new information and the speed at which it converts to the long-run average (Engle, 2004). 
GARCH (1, 1) is easy to estimate, parsimonious (compared with qth-order ARCH model) 
while successful in forecasting conditional variances. The GARCH reaction parameter (𝛾1) 
indicates the degree to which the volatility of the last period feeds through to the current 
period’s volatility, and generally ranges from 0.05 (relatively stable market) to 0.1 
(relatively volatile and nervous market). The GARCH persistence parameter (𝛿 ) falls 
between 0.85 and 0.98, with smaller values related to higher 𝛾1. Thus, the lower 𝛿 and the 
higher 𝛾1, the more spiky and jumpy is the volatility (Alexander, 2008).  
The estimation starts with finding the best-fitting AR model, which turns out to be 
AR (15) in this study. The lag length of an AR model should be long enough to capture the 
full cycle of the data. So in the case of monthly data, there should be a minimum of 12 lags. 
Moreover, to consider some seasonality carried over from year to year and across months, 
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lag lengths of 13–15 months are commonly used (Brandt & Williams, 2007). The results 
of information criteria for AR models with different lag lengths are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Lag length determination 
lag AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 21.061 21.066 21.075 
1 17.871 17.882 17.898 
2 17.604 17.621 17.646 
3 17.593 17.615 17.648 
4 17.590 17.618 17.659 
5 17.551 17.584 17.634 
6 17.512 17.551 17.608 
7 17.148 17.193 17.259 
8 17.114 17.164 17.238 
9 16.896 16.952 17.035 
10 16.904 16.965 17.056 
11 16.773 16.840 16.939 
12 16.160 16.232 16.340 
13 15.870 15.948 16.064 
14 15.772 15.855 15.979 
15 15.627* 15.716* 15.848* 
16 15.634 15.729 15.869 
17 15.640 15.741 15.890 
18 15.645 15.750 15.908 
19 15.636 15.747 15.913 




Then, a GARCH (1, 1) model was estimated using the residuals produced by the 
AR (15) model, and the variance forecast of demand would be a proxy measure for monthly 
demand uncertainty.  
Table 3.2 AR (15) model 
 Coefficient Std. Dev. 
L1. 0.231*** 0.062 
L2. 0.211*** 0.061 
L3. 0.380*** 0.066 
L4. -0.046 0.041 
L5. 0.105** 0.041 
L6. -0.108*** 0.041 
L7. 0.017 0.045 
L8. 0.022 0.047 
L9. 0.035 0.042 
L10. -0.033 0.046 
L11. 0.096** 0.037 
L12. 0.866*** 0.038 
L13. -0.216*** 0.067 
L14. -0.182*** 0.060 
L15. -0.370*** 0.066 
cons 35.205 137.907 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the coefficients of the GARCH (1, 1) model. The GARCH reaction 
parameter (𝛾1) is significant at α = 0.10, validating the use of the GARCH model in 
estimating monthly demand uncertainty. High 𝛿 and low 𝛾1 indicate that the restaurant 
industry demand is relatively stable (Alexander, 2008). To match the frequency of the 
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monthly demand uncertainty index to the yearly accounting data, monthly indices are 
averaged, equally-weighted, into a yearly average. 
Table 3.3 GARCH (1, 1) results 
 Coeff. Std. Dev 
𝛾1 0.044
* 0.026 
𝛿 0.947*** 0.045 
cons 3737.350 5857.664 
chi-sq 68123.17  
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
 The Effect of Demand Uncertainty on Investment 
Based on the theoretical literature about investment model in Chapter 2, the 
following baseline investment model is presented: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = α𝑖 + α1𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + α2(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 + 𝛼3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1
+ α5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑡−1  + α6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                       Eq. 3.3  
INV is the logarithm of capital expenditure net of depreciation expense scaled by previous 
period’s total assets (Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996); UNCER is the measure of industry-wide 
demand uncertainty. Along the uncertainty measure, several control variables were 
considered. Q is the Tobin’s q to control for firm-specific investment opportunity and 
variation in business conditions (Stein & Stone, 2012). It is calculated following (Chung 
& Pruitt, 1994); CF is cash flow defined as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and minus dividends deflated by previous period’s total assets; INDSG 
is industry sales growth, which is a log difference of the U.S annual retail sales of food 
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services and drinking places; GDP is the real GDP growth rate. Firm growth, industry sales 
growth and real GDP growth are to control for investment opportunities that might not 
have been captured by Q (Gulen & Ion, 2016). The subscript i indexes firms, and t, time.  
To match the time period between the uncertainty and the investment and ensure 
the uncertainty precedes the investment, this study calculated two uncertainty estimates for 
every year. One is over the period from January to December (Uncer12), and the other 
from July to June (Uncer6). Then, we pair accounting data of firms whose fiscal year 
ending month falls between June and November with the uncertainty index that covers July 
through June (Uncer6). For example, the accounting data in 1995 of a firm whose fiscal 
year ending month is August were matched with the uncertainty estimate that covers July 
1993 through June 1994, whereas the data of a firm whose fiscal year ends in December 
1995 were linked with the uncertainty estimate that covers January to December in 1994. 
However, this variation is subtle because the majority of sample firms face the same level 
of industry-wide uncertainty in every fiscal year. Thus, the equation does not include time-
fixed effects to prevent time variables from absorbing the effect of uncertainty (Gulen & 
Ion, 2016). 
Lastly, all firm-specific variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
minimize the impact of data errors and outliers. To improve normality, INV and UNCER 
were logarithmically transformed.  
The Hausman test and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation results indicated the 
presence of unobserved firm-specific effect and first-order serial correlation among 
residuals. Serial correlation in the panel-data models causes bias in the standard errors and 
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consequently makes the results less efficient (Drukker, 2003). Accordingly, the models 
were estimated using fixed-effect regression with AR (1) disturbances (Baltagi & Wu, 
1999).  
 The Conditional Effect of Franchising and Segment 
The following model was developed to test the moderating effect of franchising. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1)
2 +  𝛾3𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 ×
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1)
2 × 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                              Eq. 3.4              
FRAN indicates the franchise dummy (1 = Franchisors, 0 = Nonfranchisors). Franchisors 
are defined here as the firms with positive franchising-related revenue: royalty and other 
franchise fees.  
The following equation is to test the moderating role of the segment. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +  𝛾2(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1)
2 +  𝛾3𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 ×
𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1)
2 × 𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                            Eq. 3.5                                        
SEG is the segment indicator (1 = Full service, 0 = Limited-service). 
Since fixed-effect model automatically washes away the effect of time-invariant 
regressors, the Hausman-Taylor estimator was used, which is a transformed random-effect 
model (Hausman & Taylor, 1981). A general random effect model assumes that 
unobserved individual effects are not correlated with predictor variables, while a fixed 
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effect model allows for endogeneity of regressors and individual effects. Hausman and 
Taylor propose a random-effect model where some independent variables, either time-
variant or invariant, are correlated with the unobserved individual effects. In the presence 
of endogeneity among regressors, there is substantial bias in the random-effect estimators 
(Baltagi, Bresson, & Pirotte, 2003). The Hausman-Taylor estimator addresses this problem 
by allowing the correlation between some predictor variables and the individual effects. 
 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are summarized in Tables 3.4 through 
3.6. For descriptive purposes, natural (unlogged) numbers are reported for INV and UNCER. 
It is shown that a typical public restaurant chain makes 7.4 percent of investment a year. 
The average Q is 2.926 and there is a large variation in Q from 0.02 to 19.45, showing that 
even within the single industry stock market evaluation can substantially vary across firms. 
The annual sales of the U.S. foodservice and drinking places have grown at 4.7 percent on 




Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics (Total) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INV 1352 0.074 0.124 -0.101 0.644 
UNCER 1424 0.305 0.103 0.182 0.579 
Q 1409 2.926 3.789 0.020 19.445 
CF 1348 0.106 0.112 -0.432 0.333 
INDGR  1303 0.047 0.016 -0.004 0.068 
GDP 1424 0.027 0.018 -0.028 0.050 
 
Table 3.5 compares average investment rate, Q, and cash flow between 
nonfranchisors and franchisors. Given that franchisees are responsible for investment, it is 
not surprising that nonfranchisors invest more than franchisors. Franchisors report higher 
Q than nonfranchisors but no significant difference in cash flow amount.  
Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics by franchising 
 Nonfranchisors Franchisors t-test 
(μ1 = μ2)  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
INV 559 0.096 0.144 793 0.059 0.104  5.43*** 
Q 585 2.717 3.745 824 3.073 3.817 -2.12** 
CF 562 0.101 0.107 786 0.110 0.115 -1.62 
UNCER 596 0.287 0.093 828 0.318 0.108 -5.64*** 
 
Descriptive information by segment is presented in Table 3.6. Limited-service 
restaurants invest less in fixed assets than their full-service counterparts. This fact can be 
explained by the gap in the franchise ratio. The franchise ratio of the full-service chains is 
less than half of the same ratio of the limited-service chains. In terms of Q, limited-service 
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firms surpass full-service firms. This is due to the well-established fast-food chains and 
outstanding performance of fast-casual eateries. As of May 2016, the market-to-book ratio 
of Chipotle Mexican Grill is 8.59, Panera Bread 12.06, and McDonald’s 28.47, whereas 
Darden Restaurants is 4.35 and Cracker Barrel Old Country Store 6.30 (Yahoo Finance, 
2016). In terms of cash flow, the full-service restaurants have a deeper pocket.  
Table 3.6 Descriptive statistics by segment 
 Limited-service  Full-service t-test 
(μ1 = μ2)  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
INV 384 0.062 0.123 909 0.090 0.130 -3.58*** 
Q 408 3.500 4.581 944 2.510 3.238 4.52*** 
CF 392 0.095 0.125 904 0.113 0.097 -2.77*** 
FR 355 0.949 0.220 917 0.458 0.499 17.90*** 
UNCER 414 0.307 0.104 953 0.299 0.099 1.35 
Note: FR is the franchise ratio, number of franchising firm-year observations divided by the number 
of total firm-year observations in that segment.  
 
Table 3.7 displays the pairwise correlation matrix of variables. As expected, 
investment is negatively related with uncertainty but positively with Q, cash flow, GDP 
growth, and industry growth. Uncertainty has a negative association with real GDP growth, 
meaning that as the economy declines the uncertainty is on the rise. This is consistent with 
the finding in Bloom (2014). It is also shown that demand uncertainty suppresses industry 




Table 3.7 Correlation matrix 













































































Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Figure 3.1 exhibits the historical demand uncertainty and industry average 
investment rate in the restaurant industry from 1992 to 2014. There is a negative 
association between the industry demand uncertainty and the investment rate. After the 





Figure 3.1 Historical demand uncertainty and average investment 
 
3.4.2 Main Results 
The regression outcomes of the unconditional baseline model are presented in Table 
3.8. Three specifications of Eq.3.3 are estimated: column (1) includes only control 
variables, column (2) adds a linear uncertainty term, and finally column (3) estimates the 
full model, augmented by the squared uncertainty term.  
In column (1), traditional investment determinants Q and CF are positively 
significant. After the inclusion of UNCER in column (2), the uncertainty term is 
significantly negative, confirming the inhibiting impact of demand uncertainty on 
investment. The full model estimation outcomes are shown in column (3). Although the 
coefficient decreases, the linear uncertainty term still contains statistical significance. The 
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controlling for the effect of Q, CF, industry and GDP growth, consistent with the 
hypothesis.  
Table 3.8 Uncertainty effect on investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UNCER  -1.204*** -0.821*** 






Q 0.047* 0.073*** 0.071*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
CF 1.514** 1.499** 1.610*** 
 (0.595) (0.585) (0.578) 
INDGR -4.661* -5.724** -12.096*** 
 (2.585) (2.543) (2.885) 
GDP 4.158 -0.369 6.775** 
 (2.547) (2.644) (3.076) 
cons -3.439*** -3.330*** -2.932*** 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.100) 
F-value 3.82 9.69 11.91 
Prob>F  <.001  <.001  <.001 
obs 743 743 743 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 






Figure 3.2 Demand uncertainty and investment 
 
Based on the coefficients in column (3), the quadratic uncertainty–investment 
model is graphed in Figure 3.2 across one and a half standard deviations above and below 
the mean uncertainty. Combined with the results in Table 3.8, This suggests that the 
association of demand uncertainty and investment is not linear. Rather, under low levels of 
uncertainty, investment even slightly increases and then turns to a decrease with increasing 
uncertainty.    
Though not reported here, the model was run for low and high levels of uncertainty 
respectively, and there was a significantly positive relationship of uncertainty to investment 
over the range of uncertainty from the lower bound to the inflection point. According to 
Sarkar (2000), uncertainty influences investment in two ways. On one hand, uncertainty 
decreases investment as the real option theory predicts. On the other hand, uncertainty can 
increase the probability that the investment threshold will be reached, and thereby have a 
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and low-risk projects, the probability of investing actually increases for low levels of 
volatility but after a certain point it decreases with the level of volatility.  Abel and Eberly 
(1999) argue that when the user cost effect and the hangover effect are considered, there is 
an inverted U curve relation between the level of uncertainty and expected capital stock. 
Bo and Lensin (2005) also found an inverted U-shaped relationship between uncertainty 
and investment.      
Table 3.9 shows the effect of the interplay between the economic condition and 
demand uncertainty on investment. Before making the multiplicative interaction term, two 
variables of interest, INV and GDP, were centered on each mean. In column (2), the 
interaction model coefficients are reported. Both uncertainty variables are significant. 
When it comes to the interaction terms, the linear interaction coefficient is positively 





Table 3.9 Uncertainty, economy conditions, and investment 
 (1) (2) 
UNCER -0.821*** -0.811*** 







GDP 6.775** 9.391*** 
 (3.076) (3.133) 
UNCER×GDP  32.295*** 






Q 0.071*** 0.069*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
CF 1.610*** 1.641*** 
 (0.578) (0.570) 
INDGR -12.096*** -14.784*** 
 (2.885) (2.879) 
cons -2.932*** -2.516*** 
 (0.100) (0.109) 
F-value 11.91 11.53 
Prob>F  <.001  <.001 
obs 743 743 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 





Figure 3.3 Demand uncertainty and GDP growth 
 
To facilitate interpretation of the quadratic interaction term, Figure 3.3 was created 
the curvilinear relationship of uncertainty to investment between the two economic 
conditions, following the procedures suggested by Aiken, West, and Reno (1991). 
Investment rates in cases of low and high GDP growth, predicted by the interaction model, 
are depicted across one and a half standard deviations above and below the mean 
uncertainty. Though the quadratic interaction term is not statistically significant, in Figure 
3.3 there is a moderating effect of economic condition on the association between 
uncertainty and investment within the sample data range. At the same level of increase in 
uncertainty, investment rate falls more steeply in the relatively soft economy marked with 
low GDP growth than in the strong economy. That is, restaurant firms’ investment responds 
















Next, the conditional effects of franchising were examined. To estimate a pristine 
effect of franchising, local master franchisees, who operate franchising restaurants in a 
region under a contract with franchisors, were excluded from the analysis. They are 
engaged in the franchising business but do not earn franchising-related revenue. Because 
of the mixed nature of the business, they were removed from the sample. However, 
inclusion of those firms hardly alters the results. First, this study divided the estimated 
demand uncertainty into quintiles and compared the average investment between 
franchisors and nonfranchisors across the quintiles. Although both groups reduce 
investment in the face of increasing uncertainty, there is a notable gap in the degree of 
responsiveness. When uncertainty is low, there is no significant difference between the two. 
However, as the uncertainty rises, franchising restaurant firms cut investment to a greater 
extent than nonfranchising firms. In addition, franchising firms show a more dramatic 
adjustment of investment across different levels of uncertainty than nonfranchising 




Table 3.10 Two-way descriptive statistics 
  Uncertainty level1 ANCOVA 
(F-value)   1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Non-
franchise 
Mean -2.497 -2.355 -2.305 -2.380 -3.245 -2.495 9.67 
Med -2.329 -2.138 -2.243 -2.355 -3.070 -2.393 *** 
 obs 99 96 79 92 52 418  
         
Franchise Mean -2.524 -2.550 -2.620 -2.706 -3.753 -2.818 80.87 
 Med -2.379 -2.525 -2.420 -2.665 -3.542 -2.672 *** 
 obs 103 108 127 109 103 550  
         
Total Mean -2.511 -2.458 -2.499 -2.557 -3.583 -2.678 84.03 
 Med -2.343 -2.298 -2.401 -2.495 -3.352 -2.543 *** 
 obs 202 204 206 201 155 968  
Difference  
(NF-F) 
0.027 0.195 0.315 0.326 0.508 0.322 
 











Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Table 3.11 reports the results of the interaction model. To test for moderating 
effects of franchising on the nonlinear effect of uncertainty on investment, two interaction 
variables were included: a linear-by-linear interaction term (UNCER×FRAN) and a 
quadratic-by-linear interaction term (UNCER2×FRAN). Evidence of a moderation effect is 
found when the quadratic interaction term is significant and the model fit improves (Golden 
& Veiga, 2005).  
                                                 
1 Quintiles of demand uncertainty estimate 
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Panel A presents coefficients of the baseline and the interaction model estimated 
by the Hausman–Taylor regression and Panel B the main model outcomes estimated by 
fixed effect with AR (1) disturbance for nonfranchisors and franchisors respectively. In the 
baseline model, two uncertainty terms are both significantly negative but franchise dummy 
is not. However, once the interaction terms are included, the first-order uncertainty term 
becomes insignificant. As to the interaction terms, only the linear interaction coefficient 
still maintains statistical significance. Two separate regression analyses were additionally 
performed for nonfranchisors and franchisors. As hinted by the interaction model results, 
for nonfranchisors only the quadratic term is statistically significant whereas both 
uncertainty variables are significant for franchisors. The findings indicate that the 
investment functions of the two groups are not different in terms of the degree of curvature 
but in terms of location. Because the quadratic interaction term is insignificant, it fails to 




Table 3.11 Interaction model (Uncertainty and franchising) 
  Panel A  Panel B  




UNCER -0.654*** -0.240 -0.335 -1.145*** 
 (0.171) (0.232) (0.366) (0.309) 
UNCER2 -2.146*** -2.539*** -2.747*** -2.386*** 
 (0.411) (0.597) (0.883) (0.724) 
FRAN -0.188 -0.286   
 (0.169) (0.178)   
UNCER×FRAN  -0.693***   
  (0.261)   
UNCER2×FRAN  0.759   
  (0.684)   
Q .095*** 0.095*** .065* .085*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.037) (0.030) 
CF 2.759*** 2.886*** 1.724 0.956 
  (0.469) (0.491) (1.080) (0.803) 
INDGR -5.113* -5.158* -11.898*** -14.694*** 
  (2.820) (2.850) (4.583) (4.052) 
GDP 11.126*** 10.821*** 9.150* 7.243* 
  (2.895) (2.910) (4.739) (4.334) 
cons -3.255*** -3.196*** -2.881*** -2.801*** 
  (0.200) (0.204) (0.143) (0.162) 
 chi2 (Prob.>chi2) F (Prob.>F) 
 205.57 210.25 3.49 9.42 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
obs 801 790 269 426 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard error of the coefficients. 
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The results are not consistent with the hypothesis that predicts that the restraining 
impact of demand uncertainty would be mitigated in franchising firms. This phenomenon 
can be explained as an agency problem. Though the guideline of investment is specified in 
a franchise agreement, certain investments like remodeling “depend(s) on the ability, and 
willingness, of franchisees to accelerate the remodeling of their existing restaurants” 
(Burger King Worldwide Inc., 2013), implying that franchisees have discretion, to some 
degree, over capital investment decisions. When a franchisee upgrades its restaurant, the 
benefits, for which the franchisee pays the full cost, would be shared with other franchisees 
through shared brand.Thus, each franchisee would be inclined to refrain from making an 
investment and free-ride on other franchisees’ investments (Brickley & Dark, 1987; 
Williamson, 1989). This free ride problem applies to all investments that strengthen the 
brand and that cannot be specified by the franchisor (Mathewson & Winter, 1985). A 
similar argument applies between the franchisor and franchisees. Certain investments the 
franchisor makes will have some spillover benefits to franchisees. Thus, suspecting 
franchisees’ free-riding behavior, the franchisor may avoid making investments, and it can 
be expected that this tendency would be reinforced when the profitability of investment 
cannot be guaranteed due to high uncertainty. However, for nonfranchisors spillovers are 
maintained within the firm. As they do not share the gains with franchisees, they are likely 
to invest more, and it seems to allow more room for nonfranchisors to take risks and 
increase investments in a low to moderate uncertainty environment, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
In a similar vein, Michael (2000) shows that advertising falls with the degree of franchising 




Figure 3.4 Demand uncertainty, franchising, and investment 
Next, it was examined whether the effect of demand uncertainty on investment 
varies between limited- and full-service restaurants. To improve homogeneity of the 
sample, data of nonalcoholic beverage bars (NAICS 722515) and buffet chains were 
excluded from the sample. Table 3.12 displays two-way descriptive statistics of two 
segments across different levels of uncertainty. As hinted in the previous results, no 
significant change in investment is detected between the low- and medium-level 
uncertainties. Both segments considerably decrease investment in times of high uncertainty. 
When compared by the uncertainty level, however, the difference in investment between 
the two segments is not crystal clear. When uncertainty is low full-service restaurants 














Table 3.12 Two-way descriptive statistics 
  Uncertainty level ANCOVA 
  1 2 3 4 5 Total (F-value) 
Limited Mean -2.812 -2.844 -2.597 -2.551 -3.618 -2.885 15.46 
 Med -2.585 -2.740 -2.422 -2.717 -3.352 -2.762 *** 
 obs 52 50 57 54 55 268  
         
Full Mean -2.390 -2.323 -2.421 -2.410 -3.519 -2.525 47.11 
 Med -2.280 -2.238 -2.309 -2.316 -3.359 -2.379 *** 
 obs 151 152 146 148 84 680  
         
Total Mean -2.498 -2.452 -2.470 -2.448 -3.558 -2.627 66.86 
 Med -2.344 -2.298 -2.393 -2.363 -3.352 -2.492 *** 
 obs 203 202 203 202 139 949  
Difference  
(L-F) 






-1.018 -0.803 -0.471 -4.264 
 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
In Table 3.13, this study run four specifications to test the conditional effect of the 
segment. As in the test of the moderating effect of franchising, Panel A is the Hausman–
Taylor estimators and Panel B is the fixed-effect estimators with AR (1) disturbances. 
Panel A presents the regression coefficients of the baseline model and the interaction model 




Table 3.13 Interaction model (Uncertainty and segment) 
 Panel A  Panel B  
 Base Interaction Limited Full 
UNCER -0.628*** -0.828*** -1.310** -0.689*** 
 (0.179) (0.284) (0.510) (0.271) 
UNCER2 -2.021*** -0.858 0.168 -3.038*** 
 (0.430) (0.702) (1.304) (0.628) 
SEG 0.377* 0.506**   
 (0.198) (0.210)   
UNCER×SEG  0.220   
  (0.295)   
UNCER2×SEG  -1.574**   
  (0.760)   
Q .088*** 0.089*** .095** .049 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.040) (0.031) 
CF 3.298*** 3.200*** 1.289 2.204*** 
 (0.505) (0.503) (1.159) (0. 148) 
INDGR -5.532* -5.188* -4.500 -15.628*** 
 (3.008) (2.924) (7.230) (3.398) 
GDP 11.462*** 11.220*** 3.963 9.266** 
 (3.008) (3.002) (7.344) (3.620) 
cons -3.653*** -3.748*** -3.827*** -2.625*** 
 (0.235) (0.240) (0.322) (0.111) 
 chi2 (Prob.>chi2) F (Prob.>F) 
 186.53 191.01 2.97 9.59 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.009 <.0001 
obs 747 747 177 469 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 




In comparison with the base model, in the interaction model, the linear uncertainty term 
(UNCER) is negatively significant but the quadratic term (UNCER2) lost  
its significance. 
When it comes to interaction terms, only the quadratic-by-linear interaction 
coefficient (UNCER2×SEG) is statistically significant. The negative coefficient indicates 
that compared with limited-service restaurants the average investment of full-service 
restaurants falls more rapidly as the uncertainty increases, implying that full-service 
restaurants’ investments are more adversely affected by demand uncertainty than limited-
service restaurants and the gap widens along with the growing uncertainty.   
Figure 3.5 visualizes the moderating effect of segment. As suggested by the 
negative coefficient of the quadratic-by-linear interaction term (UNCER2×SEG) in Table 
3.13, the investment rate of full-service restaurants drops more steeply than that of limited-




Figure 3.5 Demand uncertainty, segment, and investment 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This study investigated how restaurant firms coordinate their fixed investment in 
the face of demand uncertainty. Four principal findings emerged: The sign of the demand 
uncertainty–investment relationship is negative. Consistent with prior studies, restaurant 
firms postpone fixed investment when it is hard to predict the industry demand. The 
association, however, is not linear. More specifically, the restricting effect of uncertainty 
is trivial or moderate for low levels of uncertainty but becomes stronger for high levels of 
uncertainty. Put differently, investment outlay drops more quickly in periods of high 
uncertainty. Follow-up tests checked whether the uncertainty–investment relationship is 
















franchising chains consistently make smaller investments than nonfranchisors but there is 
no significant difference between the two groups in terms of the degree of the 
responsiveness of investment to uncertainty. When it comes to segment, full-service 
restaurants are more adversely affected by demand uncertainty than limited-service 
restaurants, a finding that is in line with previous literature which argues that limited-
service restaurant chains have a lower income elasticity of demand and thus outperform 
full-service counterparts in recessions (Youn & Gu, 2009).  
The current study offers evidence that the impact of uncertainty on investment is 
not simply linear as implicitly assumed by most prior empirical research. However, 
because of the fact that the data are from a single industry, the generalizability of the 
conclusion is limited. Hence, future research that applies the nonlinear relationship to other 
industries and with other kinds of uncertainty is warranted to verify whether it is a general 
phenomenon or a unique situation of the restaurant industry. Furthermore, although this 
paper provides theoretical support for the nonlinear association of demand uncertainty and 
investment, the dynamics between competition, irreversibility, and uncertainty has yet to 
be verified.   
It has been argued that franchise contracts allow franchisors to reduce their business 
risk with franchisees through a sharing agreement. Franchisors share in the success of 
franchisees through royalty fees, which are tied to sales revenue of a franchised outlet and 
thus are more predictable and free from any cost inefficiency on the franchisee’s side 
(Caves & Murphy, 1976). Similarly, Koh, Rhou, Lee, and Singal (2015) argue that 
franchising restaurant chains have a lower earnings volatility, and are less vulnerable to 
65 
 
economic conditions. Moreover, franchisors can spread their business risk by 
opportunistically owning profitable stores while franchising unwanted units (Martin, 1988). 
In this aspect of the risk-sharing element of franchising, it was initially assumed that 
franchisors would be less affected by the adversity of demand uncertainty. However, the 
results do not confirm such a shield effect of franchising. Franchising companies exhibit 
the same responsiveness to uncertainty as nonfranchising firms. A potential reason lies in 
the free-riding problem. Because the fruits of investment spill over to other franchisees 
through a shared brand, a franchisee has an incentive to free ride on other franchisees and 
franchisor’s investment. This phenomenon would be strengthened when uncertainty is high 
and thus it becomes more difficult to anticipate other franchisees’ actions. Concerned about 
such an opportunistic behavior of franchisees, a franchisor may refrain from investment. 
Under the franchising agreement, a franchisor shares both risks and benefits with 
franchisees. The findings here suggest that the advantages of franchising may be swamped 
by the perceived cost associated with free-riding behavior of franchisees. 
Some additional results warrant discussion. According to the analysis of the 
conditional effect of segment, the quadratic term of uncertainty is insignificant for limited-
service chains. This indicates that the nonlinear relationship is caused by full-service 
restaurants. As mentioned before, the value of real option erodes in a competitive market 
characterized by low seller concentration (Grenadier, 2002). While the limited-service 
segment is dominated by a small number of gigantic chains, such as McDonald’s and Yum 
Brand, the full-service segment is a comparatively more atomistic market. In 2013, 13 
limited-service chains in the sample account for 10.3 percent of the market, whereas 23 
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full-service chains account for 4.7 percent, suggesting fiercer competition among the full-
service firms. Hence, when uncertainty is low, the fear of preemption may offset the value 
of waiting, loosening the uncertainty–investment relationship in full-service restaurants.   
Another explanation can be found the degree of heterogeneity of products. If two 
firms sell similar products, they attract the same groups of customers. Hence, shocks on 
demand would affect the firms’ demand functions in mostly the same manner. Conversely, 
if the goods are differentiated, the firms deal with different types of customers. This 
suggests that the heterogeneity of the products decreases the correlation between demand 
functions of different firms, and thus the firms’ demand functions would respond 
differently to shocks on the demand side (Raith, 1996). Compared to the full-service 
restaurants, the limited-service restaurants are more standardized in terms of menu 
offerings, service quality, and atmosphere. Aware that other firms in the same segment face 
similar demand curves, limited-service restaurants may find it risky to be aggressive in 
making fixed investments because if the market gets worse it will be difficult to dispose of 
idle equipment as everybody else would struggle too. However, the more variation exists 
in demand curves among firms in the segment, the greater possibility would be there that 
unwanted used equipment can be sold to other companies, reducing the risk associated with 
investment made when the environment is uncertain. 
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When making a decision on investment projects, most corporate finance textbooks 
suggest calculating the net present value (NPV). If the NPV of the project is greater than 
zero, that is, the sum of discounted future cash flows to be generated by the project is larger 
than the initial cost, the standard rule-of-thumb is to make that investment. Otherwise, 
disregard the plan. The q theory of investment is logically similar to the NPV rule. An 
investment project should be undertaken if and only if the market value of the project 
exceeds the cost. So for values of q, which is the market value of the capital relative to its 
replacement cost, greater than 1 promote investment, but values less than 1 deter 
investments (Tobin & Brainard, 1977). What is common between the two theories is that 
an investment plan should be appraised based on its expected value and cost. However, as 
described further on, there are theories that indicate a firm’s investment behavior cannot 
be understood in isolation.  
In the presence of a clear imperative about what is efficient, managers would be 
able to see the imperative and respond accordingly (Roberts & Greenwood, 1997). 
However, combined with managers’ bounded rationality, increases in ambiguity about the 
economic efficacy of a decision make it nearly impossible for decision makers to 
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assess the full-range of possible situations and predict the consequences of their decisions 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Accordingly, managers are led to search for cues from 
successful competitors or past actions and depend on social norms for guidance (Nickerson 
& Silverman, 2003; Oliver, 1997). 
No firm exists in a vacuum. As long as it participates in a market with others, they 
inevitably influence and are influenced by each other. Thus, without taking the peer effect 
into account, our understanding of corporate behavior must be limited. Based on this line 
of reasoning, this study purports to examine the peer effect on corporate investment in the 
restaurant industry- whether a firm’s investment is affected by its peers’ investment 
activities; if so, what motivates them to do so?; and are the investment outcomes different 
between peer-sensitive and less-sensitive firms? These are the main questions to be 
explored. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Peer Effect on Investment 
Tarnishing the economists’ long-standing belief in the rational agent, behavioral 
economists offer abundant evidence about bounded rationality (Conlisk, 1996). Simon 
(1955, 1972) point out the limits of rationality and proposes bounded rationality as the 
replacement. Rationality can be bounded for several reasons. Uncertainty and risk 
associated with demand or input factors and incomplete information about alternatives 
make it difficult to calculate the optimum. Moreover, human capacity for computation for 
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finding the optimum has its limit in considering all the complexity inherent in the cost 
function and other environmental constraints. Thus, individuals are naturally led to settle 
for approximate optimal solutions given the tradeoff between judgmental accuracy and 
information search and computational cost (Pitz & Sachs, 1984; Smith & Walker, 1993).  
It is not difficult to find empirical evidence that shows corporate investment 
decisions are subject to managers’ bounded rationality. According to the survey from 
(Graham & Harvey, 2001), CFOs indicate that they shy away from the NPV method, 
probably the most well-known investment criterion. Despite the theoretical superiority of 
NPV, CFOs actually prefer internal rate of return and payback period methods, which are 
much less sophisticated than NPV and do not require calculation of cost of capital and 
future cash flows. The authors additionally find that among managers who use discount 
methods, an overall firm-level discount rate is more widely adopted than a project-specific 
discount rate. Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar (2011) argue that such practice can lead to 
investment distortions. They provide evidence that firms using a single discount rate within 
the firm tend to overinvest in risky departments and underinvest in safe ones. The 
investment rate is positively associated with the spread between department beta and firm 
beta.   
Another theoretical background of the peer effect can be found in institutional 
theories. Institutional theorists view organizations as “living” forms that are adaptively 
changing in response to influences and constraints imposed by external environment and 
to the characteristics and behavior of other participants functioning in the environment 
(Selznick, 1957). A common feature observed in multiple perspectives on 
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institutionalization is that institutionalization is regarded as a social process by which 
participants come to accept shared norms, irrespective of the actor’s own beliefs or actions. 
The norms are taken for granted as the “way things are” or the “way things are to be” (Scott, 
1987). As Zucker (1983) puts it, institutionalization is rooted in conformity in search of 
legitimacy. The mere fact that many peer organizations adopt a certain innovation can grant 
legitimacy to the adoption of the innovation even without information about the economic 
gain to be earned from it. When this happens, non-adopters under the institutional pressure 
come to follow the similar path not because of economic interest but because of fear of 
being regarded as illegitimate or abnormal and thereby losing access to external resources 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Institutional isomorphism explains an organization’s isomorphic changes triggered 
by its need for conformity. Isomorphism refers to “a constraining process that forces one 
organization in a population to resemble other organizations that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (Hawley, 1968; Siegel, Agrawal, & Rigsby, 1997). The process 
of isomorphism implies that organizations operating in the same field become increasingly 
homogeneous over time.  Institutional isomorphism accounts for a considerable portion of 
corporate decisions that cannot be explained solely by rationality-based economic theory, 
such as transaction cost economics (TCE), as organizational endeavors towards conformity 
does not necessarily result in enhanced efficiency (Jones, Kosnik, & George, 1993; Moran 
& Ghoshal, 1996). Martinez and Dacin (1999) argue that the efficiency maximization of 
TCE is more suited for managerial decision-making that involves more certain and 
identifiable transaction costs but not for decisions featured with uncertainty surrounding 
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the costs or outcomes, such as innovation (Moran & Ghosal, 1996). Investment involves 
uncertainty in that the expected payoff may or may not materialize. As previously 
mentioned, high irreversibility of capital investment can aggravate the influence of 
uncertainty associated with investment.    
Not only institutional forces but also managers’ personal concerns about their 
reputation can lead them to behave similarly to other peers. Hirshleifer (1993) argues that 
managers may exploit investment projects as a way of establishing their reputation. Since 
managers care about their reputation as a decision maker, they are reluctant to deviate from 
other managers even if the decision is against substantive private information about the 
investment project. They choose to “follow the herd” and share loss with many others 
rather than to be an eccentric who unconventionally succeeds (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990).  
Lastly, competition can also stimulate mimetic behavior among firms. According 
to the prospect theory, for most individuals, a bad outcome outweighs a good outcome of 
same utility (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Borrowing this schema, Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf (1993) argue that organizations would choose to avoid being at a competitive 
disadvantage rather than to achieve a competitive advantage with equal returns. Such 
inclination to prevent the worst scenario of falling behind the average performance may 
drive organizations to behave likewise, creating a competitive bandwagon pressure. 
Similarly, Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) show that firms make investments to protect their 
share in the industry. This implies that capital investment of some firms would provoke 
their competitors to increase capacity so that there is no significant variation in market 
shares. If competitors provide more value to customers through investment, the firm would 
72 
 
feel urged to do the same thing in order to be on a par with its competitors. Behind the rush 
of burger giants’ costly cosmetic remodeling, lies a fear of being left behind (Nichols, 
2013). Such a desperate situation facing the restaurant industry is well summarized in the 
following comment.  
“In the ailing restaurant industry, it’s a game of market share in the U.S. With 
little room to open new restaurants in a country…, growth comes from stealing 
customers from one another” (Jargon, 2012 as cited by Gara, 2012).  
Akdoğu and MacKay (2012) demonstrate that competitive market forces lead firms 
to coordinate investment. In their setting, firms tend to make similar investments when the 
risk of falling behind outweighs the cost of duplication. The restaurant industry is 
characterized with intense competition, low entry barrier (Zwolak, 2010), and short life 
cycle of product (Tse & Olsen, 1988). Switching cost of customers is also relatively low 
compared to other consumer service industries, such as banking and telephone 
communications. Thus, restaurant firms constantly invest and transform themselves in 
order to not be left behind in the saturated market (Nichols, 2013). By contrast, the cost of 
duplication is relatively low. Compared to manufacturing or high-technology industries of 
which capacity expansion is usually lumpy requiring huge capital commitment and a years-
long construction period, opening a new restaurant can be done in a shorter time span with 
less cash.  
H1: A restaurant firm’s investment is positively affected by the investment of its 
peers.     
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Individuals are more likely to imitate others when optimization is costly or time-
consuming and their own information is noisy (Banerjee, 1992; Conlisk, 1980). 
Uncertainty makes it difficult for managers to assess the full range of possible situations 
and to predict the consequences of their decisions (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) argue that uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages imitation. 
When an organization struggles with a problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, 
problemistic search may yield a viable solution with little expense (Cyert & March, 1963). 
A line of research in asset pricing literature lends empirical support to the idea. Avery and 
Zemsky (1998) specify the dimensions of uncertainty and show that the herding behavior 
increases as each uncertainty dimension is added. Chan, Hwang, and Mian (2005) observe 
that mutual fund managers tend to show herding behavior when they lack reliable 
information about the stocks.  
Chief executive officers interviewed by Daft, Sormunen, and Parks (1988) indicate 
customers, competitors, and economic sector impose the most considerable strategic 
uncertainty, which is measured in terms of importance, complexity and rate of change. The 
same paper also reports that the greater strategic uncertainty in environmental sectors, the 
more frequently managers scan them (Daft et al., 1988). High-performing firms show 
consistently high correlation between strategic uncertainty and scanning frequency. Daft 
et al. (1998) reveal that companies view competitors as a source of significant strategic 




As managers perceive higher uncertainty in the competitor sector, they perform scanning 
more frequently. For these reasons, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
H2: The peer effect is more pronounced when uncertainty is high.     
 
4.2.2 Identification of Peers 
The Merriam-Webster defines a peer as “a person who belongs to the same age 
group or social group as someone else”. Translated to a business nomenclature, peers 
broadly refer to organizations that operate in the same industry or market. In a narrower 
sense, peers would probably be regarded as a group of firms doing business in similar 
circumstances, such as serving similar groups of customers and deploying similar resources. 
Since firms situated in a similar environment are likely to evolve into competitors, this 
study relies on the literature for competitor identification and the situation of the restaurant 
industry in defining peers.  
Chen (2006) defines competitors as “firms operating in the same industry, offering 
similar products, and targeting similar customers.” Competitor identification involves 
classifying firms on the basis of relevant similarities. A variety of perspectives have been 
suggested to conceptualize the “similarities.” For example, resource similarity or market 
commonality (Chen, 1996), the supply-based attributes (characteristics of firms) versus the 
demand-based attributes (characteristics of consumers) (Clark & Montgomery, 1999), and 
market-based and resource-based comparisons (Peteraf & Bergen, 2003).  
This study defined quick-service restaurants (QSR), fast casual brands, and casual 
dining chains as the sample for testing peer effect. First of all, they compete against each 
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other for similar target customers. According to the industry report by Technomic, a 
Chicago-based market research firm, 85 percent of survey respondents reported that they 
visit fast-casual brands at least once a month, and 82 percent said they eat at casual-dining 
restaurants once a month (Technomic 2013 as cited by Brandau, 2013). That is, fast-casual 
brands and casual-dining chains are both available options for many customers. 
Particularly, when the economy collapses, many diners trade down for more affordable 
dining options; competition among the three segments is more intensified. Indeed, as 
casual-dining traffic counts declined considerably during and after the recent recession, 
QSRs and fast-casual brands were targeting the customers in limbo and trying to gain 
market shares. To attract the customers who are price-minded but concerned about the 
quality of food and environment at the same time, limited-service restaurants infused 
casual-dining traditions into their menu, dining-experience, and environment while 
maintaining key appealing features including convenience, efficiency, and affordability 
(Brandau, 2014c).  
Strategic similarity increasingly observed in those three segments is another reason 
for the peer identification in this essay. Gimeno and Woo (1996) argue that inter-firm 
rivalry increases with the degree of strategic similarity and multimarket contact. Given the 
even level of multimarket contact, strategic similarity intensifies rivalry because strategic 
similarity is often associated with greater product substitutability (d'Aspremont, 
Gabszewicz, & Thisse, 1979) and the lack of unique resources. Explosive growth of the 
fast-casual segment has outshined the overall restaurant industry over the past few years. 
Total U.S. sales revenue of fast casual restaurants has consistently grown from to $30 
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billion in 2013, and is still pictured with rosy forecasts of a 26.7 percent of growth, reaching 
$38 billion in 2018 (Mintel, 2013). Inspired and partly threatened by the success of fast-
casual restaurants, QSRs have been scrambling to adopt fast-casual concepts, such as 
healthful menus featuring low-calorie and high-protein items, customization options, and 
sophisticated décor (Mintel, 2013; Ries, 2013; Walkup, 2007). Casual dining restaurants 
have also aggressively penetrated this segment via diverse limited time offers and low-
priced and small-portion menus (Mintel, 2013). A comment of a restaurant analyst 
manifests the tension in this segment, "Fast casual concepts have been stealing share from 
fast food and they have raised the bar for fast-food restaurants, which are trying to step up 
and compete," said Bonnie Riggs, restaurant analyst for NPD Group Inc. (Jargon, 2012). 
All the evidence implies that QSRs, fast casuals, and casual dining restaurants experience 
the isomorphic pressure. 
Lastly, strategic movement is easily noticed and imitable in most cases. This means 
that innovative strategies can spread quickly and thus are likely to be institutionalized in a 
relatively short period. For instance, McDonald’s inventive introduction of breakfast items 
and coffee beverages was quickly copied by Burger King, Wendy’s, Jack in the Box and 
Taco Bell (Jennings, 2014). Renovation is no exception. Not only QSRs but also many 
casual dining brands have joined the rally of renovation to rejuvenate the brand and boost 
sales (Ruggless, 2012, 2013). New restaurant interior concepts and the news of remodeling 
projects and outcomes are quickly distributed through trade magazines and industry news 
media.       
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Lastly, size is considered as one more criterion of peer identification. Firm size has 
been regarded as an important characteristic in organizational research (Chen & Hambrick, 
1995) and has been referred to as one of classification variables in strategic groups research 
(Lewis & Thomas, 1990). Clark and Montgomery (1999) reported that size was one of top 
ten attributes managers used in identifying competitors. To improve the similarity in size, 
the firms in the top and bottom deciles of the distribution of net sales revenue were 
excluded from the sample. This step decreased the variance of size from $2,860 to $469 
million. 
 
4.2.3 Motives for Following Peers 
Mimetic isomorphism emphasizes the role of uncertainty as a strong facilitator of 
imitation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding goals or 
environments can lead organizations to model themselves on other organizations that they 
perceive to be successful. When uncertainty hinders a search for optimal solutions, 
imitating well-established institutions would fetch them legitimacy, which comes to be 
critical for organizational survival. Thus, the greater the need for legitimacy, the more 
prone is the organization to mimetic isomorphism.  
It is likely that organizations with concerns for survival imitate successful 
competitors to achieve legitimacy and thereby get access to necessary resources. Firms that 
face immediate concerns for survival would put higher priority on legitimacy 
considerations than on efficiency considerations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). When survival 
is less assured, the need to acquire critical resources can lead the firm to weigh and act on 
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certain imperatives, such as legitimacy, at the sacrifice of long-run efficiency (Martinez & 
Dacin, 1999). Similarly, Leary and Roberts (2014) argue that firms that have greater 
learning motives and perhaps greater need to earn reputation tend to follow successful 
leaders in setting capital structure. They found that less successful firms are sensitive to 
changes in capital structure of leaders but not vice versa.  
In a similar vein, making decisions to expand or stay still is not always clear. 
Despite their logical appeal, it is a general notion that NPV and q theory do not come in 
handy for managers. For example, in case of NPV, it is not a simple task to estimate the 
future cash flow stream and relevant cost of capital of a particular project. Moreover, NPV 
does not take into consideration the value of real option attached to the project. When it 
comes to q theory, calculating the marginal market value to be created by a focal project is 
usually not feasible. Furthermore, stock prices can be contaminated by fads and bubbles. 
Such difficulty would be more prevalent amongst young, small, and less successful firms 
that probably do not have well-established process for investment decision making. 
Consequently, it is predicted that less successful firms would follow their successful peers 
in making investment decisions but not vice versa. Stated formally,    
H3: Less successful firms are responsive to the investment activity of successful 
peers but not vice versa. 
The hypothesis testing results for H1 and H3 would cast light on the underlying 
reasons for peer effect. If the null hypothesis of only H1 and not of H3, is rejected, 
competition-based view or managers’ reputation concerns can explain the imitation 
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behavior. On the other hand, if both null hypotheses are rejected, learning or legitimacy-
seeking motives would provide additional account for the mimicry. 
 
4.2.4 Investment Outcomes of Peer-Sensitive Firms 
So far it has been argued that restaurant firms’ investments are influenced by those 
of peers. Managers would be left with a final question whether I should follow my peers 
or invest against the tide. Answering the question requires assessing the investment 
outcomes of peer-influenced group and of the counterpart. However, it is not a simple task 
to single out firms that actually follow other peer firms through an indirect approach using 
secondary data. This study gets around this problem by evaluating the investment outcomes 
of peer-sensitive and less sensitive firms, where the sensitivity is measured as correlation. 
Firms whose investment spending is influenced by their peers are likely to have a high 
correlation with that of peers, but the opposite does not necessarily hold. Therefore, by 
investigating the performance implications of investment of peer-sensitive and less-
sensitive firms, the current study can indirectly examine the consequences of following 
peers.  
Banerjee (1992) argues that herding behavior suppresses the use of personally-
collected information and thus causes a reduction of informativeness, harming social 
welfare and impairing decision making. In this setting, society may benefit from businesses 
making individual decisions based on their own information gathering. Consequently, 
imitating behavior leads to inferior information aggregation and overall impaired decisions 
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Welch, 1992). Lieberman and 
80 
 
Asaba (2006) argue that by reducing the variation in firms’ strategies mimetic behavior 
inflates the collective risk of the industry when the environment is uncertain. Firms that 
pursue a differentiation strategy and market position can be insulated from the actions of 
rivals. This can lower the likelihood of mimicry and improve profitability.   
Renovating or opening restaurants around the same time with competitors will 
increase competitive interference, diminishing the returns on investment. As previously 
mentioned, a significant number of QSRs and casual dining restaurants have carried out 
large renewal projects. The renovation concept is quite similar between brands: updated 
exteriors and modernized dining areas decorated with features such as wall-mounted TVs, 
Wifi and lounge seating (Nichols, 2013). The similarity of renovation designs across 
different chains may take away the limelight of each brand’s fresh reimaged units, causing 
a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of investment (Burke & Srull, 1988).  In addition, 
rivalry-based imitation raises the intensity of competition and reduces profitability (Barreto 
& Baden‐Fuller, 2006; Deephouse, 1999). In a study that examines the branching behavior 
of the Portuguese banking industry, Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) found that mimetic 
branching imposes a negative effect on the profit margin.    
H4: Investment of peer-sensitive firms is not as effective as that of less peer-




4.3.1 Estimating Peer Effect on Investment 
The specification can be represented by the following investment model extended 
by the variables of demand uncertainty and peers’ average investment: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1  + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                Eq. 4.1  
INV is the capital expenditure net of depreciation expense, scaled by total assets in the 
previous period; 𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖 is the average of the investment ratio of peers excluding that of the 
own firm; Q is the Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of assets to the replacement cost. 
It was calculated following Chung and Pruitt (1994); CF is cash flow defined as the ratio 
of earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus dividends to the total 
assets in the previous period; INDSG is industry sales growth, which is the log difference 
of the U.S annual retail sales of limited-service eating places; GDP is the annual real GDP 
growth rate. 
A major issue in assessing peer effect is to control for the possibility that the peer 
effect falsely picks up the impact of other investment determinants. Differently put, firms 
can make similar investments not because they imitate competitors but because they see 
similar opportunities. To prevent such “spurious” peer effect, this study included average 
Q, industry sales growth, and real GDP growth, all of which were to control the firm’s 
investment opportunities. Theoretically, Q should capture all investment opportunities and 
challenges a firm is faced because the value of all information relevant to the firm, either 
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it is public or private, should be appropriately reflected in the firm’s stock price (Fama, 
1970; Tobin & Brainard, 1977). Nevertheless, two more filters were added, industry and 
GDP growth. They help to capture the investment opportunity that all firms face, and Q is 
to reflect residual firm-specific investment opportunities. Lastly, the model was augmented 
by CF, which was to control for the resource for investment. 
Furthermore, additional moderating models were tested in order to check that 
demand uncertainty plays a role on peer-driven investment. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾i +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                  Eq. 4.2 
  
4.3.2 Motives for Following Peers 
In reference to Leary and Roberts (2014), sample firms were classified into two 
groups, leaders and followers, according to three criteria: size, profitability, and q. More 
specifically, sample firms were divided into quintiles each year based on their ranking in 
the three performance measures: the top two quintiles were regarded as “leaders” and the 
bottom two deciles as “followers”.  Then, the investment rates of followers were regressed 
on those of leaders and vice versa.   
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                       Eq. 4.3 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                      Eq. 4.4 
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FINV (LINV) is the investment rate of a firm in the follower (leader) group; 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is the leader (follower) firm average investment rate. 
 
4.3.3 Investment Outcomes of Peer-Sensitive Firms 
The sensitivity of investment of the focal firm to its peers was captured by the 
correlation between the firm’s investments at time t and its peers average investment rates 
at time t-1. Firms whose data points are less than five were excluded from the correlation 
calculation. Once the correlation coefficients were obtained for each firm, the sample firms 
were divided into three groups, and the firms on top (bottom) third are denoted as peer-
sensitive (less peer-sensitive) firms. Based on the classification, a binary indicator is 
created.  
𝑃𝑆 (𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟‐ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟‐ 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠         
0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟‐ 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
 
To test whether there is a significant difference in the investment outcome, here it 
is market share, the following multiplicative interaction model is developed.  
𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑆i,t−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                     Eq. 4.5          
MS is expressed as a fraction and is calculated as the firm’s sales revenue divided by the 
U.S. retail sales of food services and drinking places; and PROF is the operating profit 
margin, which is operating income after depreciation over sales revenue; GDP is the annual 
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real GDP growth. The subscript i indexes firms, and t, time. To mitigate skewness, the 
natural log-transformation was taken for the variables MS and INV.  
To prevent the fixed-effect model automatically removing the effect of time-
invariant regressors, the Hausman-Taylor estimator was used as in the first study (Hausman 
& Taylor, 1981). 
 
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the main variables. For descriptive 
purposes, natural (unlogged) numbers are reported for INV and PEER. The variable PEER 
has a smaller variance than INV because PEER is an aggregated investment rate of entire 
firms but the focal firm in the group. PS is the correlation between the investment rate of 
focal firm and its peers over the sample period. Firms whose data points are less than five 
were excluded from the correlation calculation. There is a large variation in PS from the 




Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INV 999 0.089 0.132 -0.101 0.645 
Q 994 2.687 3.636 0.020 19.445 
CF 988 0.114 0.098 -0.431 0.333 
PEER  999 0.053 0.025 0.013 0.107 
MS 999 0.001 0.001 0.00009 0.008 
PROF 999 0.066 0.064 -0.261 0.264 
PS 84 0.186 0.496 -0.959 0.906 
 
4.4.2 Main Results 
The fixed effect regression results are summarized in Table 4.2. Coefficients and 
corresponding standard errors are reported. Column (1) and (2) show the baseline results. 
As expected, a focal firm’s investment is negatively associated with demand uncertainty 
but positively with peer’s investment. Even after controlling for industry expansion, 
economic growth and the firm’s unique investment opportunities and financial resources, 
peer effect is significant, suggesting that sample firms adjust investment following their 
peers in the market.  
Next the conditional effect of uncertainty was examined. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, a positive moderating effect of uncertainty is observed in column (3). The 
investment model results were also compared between the cases of high and low 
uncertainty in column (4) and (5). Observations in the top (bottom) third of uncertainty 
estimate distribution were assigned to the high (low) uncertainty group.   
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Table 4.2 Peer effect on investment 






















PEER  0.888*** 0.764*** 0.254 1.902*** 
   (0.178) (0.186) (0.498) (0.575) 
UNCER -1.329*** -0.668** -0.345 2.114 -0.698* 
  (0.286) (0.308) (0.338) (1.562) (1.021) 
PEER×UNCER   1.091**   
    (0.486)   
Q .084*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.303*** -0.006 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.079) (0.090) 
CF 0.613 0.805 0.872 0.590 -1.852 
  (0.779) (0.765) (0.762) (0.866) (2.498) 
INDGR -6.537** -6.333** -11.649*** -23.596** -21.685** 
  (3.255) (3.191) (3.961) (10.690) (8.752) 
GDP 0.452 4.509 7.988** -21.312 33.349*** 
  (3.464) (3.494) (3.807) (21.293) (9.054) 
cons -3.110*** -3.231*** -2.941*** 0.015** -1.443*** 
  (0. 118) (0.124) (0.142) (1.003) (0.472) 
F-value 6.61*** 10.78*** 10.05*** 3.30*** 4.86*** 
obs 519 518 518 139 127 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard error of the coefficients. 
 
In column (4), the PEER coefficient is insignificant, meaning that sample restaurant 
firms do not pay much attention to peers’ movement if the market demand is moderately 
uncertain. The significant coefficient of Q indicates that investments are made based upon 
the firm’s investment opportunities. Conversely, when uncertainty is considerably high, 
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sample firms become highly responsive to peer investment behavior. The fact that Q loses 
its statistical significance implies that traditional determinants of investment may be of 
little use in explaining investment behavior when managerial decisions are tainted by 
substantial uncertainty. All in all, the results support that uncertainty prevalent in the 
industry works as a strong motive to imitate peers. 
To examine the motive behind the peer effect, the analysis was rerun using the 
sample of leaders and followers. Identification of leaders and followers is based on three 
criteria: market share, profitability and Q. For each year, this study ranked sample firms 
based on their market share and assigned those firms in the top two quintiles as leaders and 
those in the bottom two as followers. The same procedure was repeated in terms of 
profitability and Q. Table 4.3 presents descriptive summary for leaders and followers. 
Leaders are commonly marked with larger market share, higher profitability, Q and cash 
flow. The only factor the three criteria do not agree is investment. While leaders based on 
profitability and Q make more investments than followers, market share leaders appear to 
make less investment. It is probably because several rising stars with small market share 
but armed with superior margins and growth prospect are aggressive in investment 




Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for leaders and followers 
  M/S  Profitability Q  
  Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower 
INV Mean -2.885 -2.476 -2.468 -2.745 -2.419 -2.836 
 Med -2.705 -2.320 -2.344 -2.648 -2.272 -2.706 
 obs 391 340 455 302 432 324 
M/S Mean 0.0065 0.0002 0.0052 0.0009 0.0047 0.0007 
 Med 0.0030 0.0002 0.0018 0.0003 0.0019 0.0003 
 obs 531 532 532 528 528 523 
PROF Mean 0.094 0.028 0.125 0.003 0.094 0.034 
 Med 0.084 0.036 0.107 0.020 0.091 0.037 
 obs 531 532 553 554 546 547 
Q Mean 4.137 1.643 4.589 1.347 5.787 0.567 
 Med 2.876 0.728 3.112 0.757 4.159 0.567 
 obs 527 521 548 543 546 547 
CF Mean 0.130 0.086 0.161 0.047 0.148 0.081 
 Med 0.133 0.109 0.167 0.071 0.166 0.096 
 obs 509 495 513 527 506 528 
 
Once leaders and followers were defined, the investment rates of followers were 
regressed on the average investment rate of leaders and vice versa in order to see whether 
each group is sensitive to the counterpart’s investment activity. The results are reported in 




Table 4.4 Who follows whom? 
 Market share Profitability Q 
 Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower 
Leader  0.758***  0.637**  0.290** 
   (0.243)  (0.276)  (0.131) 
Follower 0.349***  0.110***  0.112**  
 (0.090)  (0.033)  (0.047)  
UNCER -0.333 0.032 -1.182*** -0.993 -0.680* -1.038* 
  (0.411) (0.551) (0.393) (0.711) (0.401) (0.548) 
Q .051 0.151* -0.018 0.204** 0.038 -0.714 
  (0.042) (0.088) (0.032) (0.087) (0.030) (0.558) 
CF 4.559*** 2.950*** -0.127 3.093*** 2.523 3.054* 
  (1.565) (1.078) (1.641) (1.065) (1.575) (1.715) 
INDGR -7.042* -9.300 -5.860 -3.313 -7.069 -22.817*** 
  (4.119) (6.879) (4.119) (8.485) (5.174) (6.466) 
GDP 1.798 6.987 3.370 -7.829 6.870* 0.415 
  (3.842) (7.256) (4.003) (8.719) (3.883) (7.303) 
cons -2.868*** -0.734 -2.427*** -1.238*** -3.184*** -1.139*** 
  (0. 159) (0.477) (0.129) (0.384) (0.130) (0.345) 
F-value 7.07*** 4.00*** 7.72*** 3.75*** 3.89*** 4.65*** 
obs 249 192 189 117 203 158 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard error of the coefficients. 
 
According to the results, both groups are sensitive to each other’s investment 
activity. Regardless of performance level, restaurant firms appear to affect and be affected 
by one another’s behavior, and this means that the null H3 is rejected. The fact that the 
leader group’s investment is still influenced by the follower group suggests that even 
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superior performers are concerned with maintaining the quality and size of their facilities 
at par with others and protecting their market share. 
Table 4.5 Investment effect on market share of peer-sensitive firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
MSt-1 0.719
*** 0.820*** 0.808*** 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) 
INV  0.041*** 0.063*** 
   (0.006) (0.010) 
PS  0.138** 0.158** 
   (0.060) (0.063) 
INV×PS   -0.036*** 
    (0.012) 
PROF 0.502* 0.214 0.215 
  (0.293) (0.195) (0.193) 
GDP -0.528 -0.167 -0.054 
  (0.486) (0.398) (0.395) 
cons -1.957*** -1.289*** -1.385*** 
  (0. 112) (0.122) (0.125) 
 F (Prob.>F) chi2 (Prob.>chi2) 
 241.00***a 3525.68*** 3573.43*** 
obs 558 419 419 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard error of the coefficients. 
a Because the Hausman-Taylor requires at least one time-invariant variable in the model, it cannot 
be used for the base model with only control variables. Here the fixed-effect model with AR (1) is 
employed.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the estimated coefficients of Eq. 4.5. In column (2), the main 
effects are reported. Investment and peer-sensitive indicator are both positively associated 
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with market share. That means firms whose investment is relatively more sensitive to 
competitors tend to be larger firms. The moderating effect of peer-sensitivity of investment 
is presented in column (3). The interaction coefficient of INV*PS is negatively significant, 
suggesting that the positive effect of investment on market share is smaller for peer-
sensitive firms. That is, firms whose investment spending moves together with that of rivals 
yield a smaller investment return than firms whose investments are less sensitive to peers. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study purports to examine the peer effect on corporate investment in the 
restaurant industry. Consistent with the hypotheses, restaurant firms appeare to be 
influenced by their peers in making investments. After controlling for the effect of Q, cash 
flow and industry and economy growth and, the so-called peer-effect emerges as significant. 
That is, firms make investment decisions based not only on investment opportunities and 
resources they have but also on peers’ investments. The results further reveal that 
uncertainty is a powerful force that leads firms to follow peers in making investments.  
Additional tests were performed to identify the underlying motives for mimicking 
investment behavior. The results reveal that mimetic behavior does not work in one 
direction but rather in bilateral direction. This implies that the mimicry is not driven by 
learning motives or legitimacy-seeking of less successful players but rather by competitive 
motives of firms.   
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Lastly, this study tested the performance implications of investments by peer-
sensitive firms; whether they make better investment decisions. The results suggest that 
investment of peer-sensitive firms is not as effective as that of less-sensitive firms in 
growing market share. Opening or renovating restaurants simultaneously with rivals can 
increase the competitive interference among the brands, and thus may erode the 
profitability of investment. This finding, combined with the results associated with H3, 
suggests that investment driven by a competitive motive can produce poor returns. This is 
in line with extant research that argues the risk of “hop on an investment bandwagon” 
(Barreto & Baden‐Fuller, 2006; Grundvåg Ottesen & Grønhaug, 2006).  There is a caveat 
related to the methodology, however. Here the peer sensitivity was captured by correlation 
in a sense that firms following peers are likely to have a high correlation with them. 
However, the opposite is not necessarily true. Therefore, the current analysis can offer a 
glimpse of the consequences of following peers but does not allows us to reach a definitive 
statement. 
With regards to this finding, it is worth noting a pitfall of following peers. In 2000’s 
most well-known QSR brands competitively carry out large-scale renovation projects, a 
convincing example of peer effect. In 2015, Wendy’s sued DavCo, the fourth largest 
franchisee, over its refusal to renovate restaurants. DavCo files counterclaim arguing that 
the franchisor’s “Image Activation” program is economically infeasible. DavCo claims 
that remodeling may create a jump in sales right after re-opening but has failed to yield 
sustained return on investment. Moreover, the fact that there have been eight different 
remodel designs only in four years since the onset of the renovation project implies that 
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the reimaging initiative had been made in a hasty manner rather than being a well-thought-
out plan (Maze, 2015). This case raises another research topic of worth exploring; examine 
how the return on investment has evolved with time and whether it is a sustainable strategy 
in the long run. 
The findings deepen our understanding about the investment behavior of restaurant 
firms under uncertainty. This study casts some light on the human factor of corporate 
investment decisions, which has not attracted much attention from hospitality finance 
literature. In addition, it contributes to the line of research on managerial decision making. 
For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discussed heuristics and biases that are used 
by individuals to make decisions under uncertainty, challenging the economists’ long-
standing belief in the rational agent. The peer effect observed in the current study provides 
another piece of evidence for managers’ bounded rationality.  
In testing the peer effect, the current study took an indirect approach using the 
secondary data rather than conduct a direct observation of imitating behavior. Although 
well-known investment determinants were controlled, the possibility cannot be completely 
ruled out that the peer variable might spuriously capture other residual investment 
opportunities. Thus, researchers interested in imitating behavior among businesses may 
find real settings in which they can directly monitor a mimicking behavior. 
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CHAPTER 5. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT 





As previously argued, delay or retreat of investment is a common approach taken 
by firms facing demand uncertainty. In fact, in the face of the recent economic turmoil, 
capital expenditure in the restaurant industry plummeted to a record-low level (Lockyer, 
2009). However, is this truly the best policy to be pursued?  
Uncertainty poses a dilemma for businesses: whether to cut costs and investment 
to protect survival in the short-term at the sacrifice of future returns or to maintain (or 
increase) investment at the risk of liquidity deficit, hoping to occupy an advantageous 
position once the demand bounces back (Silberston, 1983). One line of research that deals 
with retrenchment points out the aftermath of retrenchment strategy. By reducing or 
forgoing investment projects, firms run the risk not only of losing market share to 
competitors but also of threatening foundations for future growth. In a similar vein, another 
line of research argues about the strategic value of proactive investment. Firms that regard 
crises as opportunities and undertake proactive investment can expand their businesses and 
strengthen their competitive advantages over weaker rivals, who are waiting for the 
recession to pass.   
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In the line of this reasoning, this final essay examines the effectiveness of 
investment made under uncertainty. More specifically, it aims at providing theoretical and 
empirical implications and the long-term performance consequences of investment made 
under demand uncertainty in terms of growth in sales, market share, and  
profit margin.   
 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Financial Implication of Investment Under Uncertainty 
Although there are no direct empirical findings about demand uncertainty and the 
effectiveness of investment, given that economic uncertainty rises in recessions and falls 
in expansions (Bloom, 2014), the literature on countercyclical effectiveness of investment 
indirectly offers a theoretical background.  
Retrenchment strategies involve cutting costs or trimming noncore assets (Kitching, 
Blackburn, Smallbone, & Dixon, 2009). Studies indicate that retrenchment is a typical 
response to performance declines (Denis & Kruse, 2000; Geroski & Gregg, 1997; Robbins 
& Pearce, 1992). Declining firms initially need to retrench to stabilize declining 
performance with the objective of sustaining the firm's survival and attaining positive cash 
flows (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).  Shrinking investment might enhance liquidity over the 
short run, but is not a panacea. Scholars have noted the long-term hazard of cutback 
initiatives. By disposing of assets or forgoing investment plans, firms risk losing the 
foundations for growth for post-recession expansion.  
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Geroski and Gregg (1997) found that firms that implemented cutting back practices 
or abandoned their investment plans were hit harder and experienced greater difficulties 
during recovery. In contrast, firms that engaged in new product development, process 
innovation and training to solidify their competitive strengths outperformed rivals. 
Similarly, Accenture, a market research firm, reported that the top performers in the period 
following the early‐1990s recession were those who made strategic investments, developed 
new market or customer niches, and experimented with new business models (Accenture, 
2003).   
Srinivasan, Rangaswamy, and Lilien (2005) proposed a concept of proactive 
investment, which is the development and execution of investment initiatives in downturns 
as the reflection of the firm’s interpretation of recession as an opportunity to strengthen 
and establish their advantages over weaker competitors. They examined the antecedents 
and consequences of proactive investment in terms of marketing, and found that firms that 
have a proactive marketing response in a downturn achieve superior performance even 
before the downturn ends. Similarly, other scholars observe firms that have a strategic 
emphasis on proactive marketing and R&D achieve superior business performance after, 
even during, the recession (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, 
Steenkamp, & Leeflang, 2009; Steenkamp & Fang, 2011).  
In addition, the production cost falls along with decreases in demand for investment 
activities. For example, during the recent economic turmoil, rents dropped nearly 66 
percent in prime locations (Schrambling, 2009). Moreover, as the average chef salary 
decreased 4–16 percent in 2007–2009 (Bell & Martinelli, 2010), restaurant owners could 
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tap a huge pool of talented chefs who were willing to work at a lower wage and gain the 
upper hand in negotiations with service vendors (Schrambling, 2009).  
Capital investment in the restaurant industry mostly involves construction, 
acquisition, maintenance, and refurbishing of restaurants. Other capital expenditures 
include investments in information technology systems and production facilities. It has 
been argued that the physical environment plays a pivotal role in restaurant patrons’ 
emotions (Jang & Namkung, 2009; Liu & Jang, 2009), perceived value (Jang & Namkung, 
2009; Liu & Jang, 2009), brand image (Ryu, Lee, & Kim, 2012), and behavioral intention 
(Auty, 1992). Don Thompson, the Chief Executive Officer of McDonald’s Corp succinctly 
puts the importance of physical atmosphere “The look and feel of the restaurants has a 
more significant impact on the brand in the near-term  People eat with their eyes first” 
(Gasparro, 2012b). Alex Macedo, the president of Burger King’s North American system, 
said “We recognize that when our guests drive down the street today, they have many 
dining options  In a competitive market, having a fresh new image is one of the main 
ways we can differentiate ourselves” (Brandau, 2014a). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that remodeling can be an effective tool for differentiating brands and increasing 
the value of the dining experience. Such reimaging efforts would be more easily noted in 
times of high uncertainty when competition interference is reduced as most companies 
shrink capital expenditure (Danaher, Bonfrer, & Dhar, 2008). 
H1: As the level of uncertainty increases, firms that increase the level of 
investment would experience better operating performance compared with 
when they do in times of low uncertainty. 
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5.2.2 Moderating Effect of Financial Constraint 
 We have reviewed academic findings of countercyclical effectiveness of 
investment. However, is this argument applicable for firms with different conditions? 
Probably not. For financially constrained firms such claim may sound like a luxury. It may 
be a better choice for them to delay investment projects and reserve funds to get ready for 
worse scenarios that might happen.  
In the face of demand shocks, financially constrained firms would be more passive 
and defensive due to the risk of bankruptcy. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) indicate that 
firms with high financial leverage tend to shrink investment for building long-term market 
share in response to negative shocks to demand because of greater probability of default 
while less constrained firms become aggressive in investment to take advantage of the 
situation. Investigating the causal relationship between capital structure and pricing 
behavior in the supermarket industry during the recession in early 1990’s, Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1996) found that national chains (less financially constrained) dropped 
product prices to a greater extent than local or regional chains (relatively more constrained). 
Rather, highly leveraged chains increased prices to boost short term profits, resulting in 
countercyclical markups. The fact that financially constrained firms become passive in 
investment implies that the attractiveness of investment may dissipate in financially fragile 
firms.  
From the liquidity management perspective, making investments is associated with 
increased default risk. Acquisition or construction of new restaurants and remodeling of 
existing outlets usually require long-term planning, and execution and commitment of 
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sizable financial resources. Under the U.S. GAAP, capital expenditure is capitalized and 
depreciated over the life of the asset, leading to an increase in operating leverage ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, given that restaurant firms tend to finance their capital requirements 
largely via cash from operations (Basham, 2009) or long-term debt (Jang & Ryu, 2006), 
capital expenditures are likely to increase financial burden. When the future prospect of 
the market is foggy, maintaining operational and financial flexibility are considered key 
objectives (Denis, 2011; Grewal & Tansuhaj, 2001). Thus, extending rigidity of operating 
leverage and capital structure in the presence of uncertainty may result in greater default 
risk.  
Arguably, the less confident (more uncertain) about the future, the greater the need 
for flexibility (Jones & Ostroy, 1984). Jones and Ostroy (1984) demonstrate that in the 
presence of uncertainty the preference for cash surpasses that for any other type of assets 
even when money is dominated by all other assets in terms of return and the reversing cost 
of illiquid assets is modest. Particularly, a thirst for liquidity is strong in the foodservice 
industry. Parsa, Self, Njite, and King (2005) argue that early failure of restaurants is partly 
attributed to the lack of resources that allow them to be flexible and adapt to changing 
environments. Moreover, most restaurant businesses operate with a thin level of working 
capital and large amount of short-term debt (Mun & Jang, 2015). Given the evidence, it is 
predicted that the value of investment would depend on the financial status of the company. 
Formally put, the effectiveness of investment will not be as high for financially constrained 
firms as for non-financially constrained firms due to the increased default risk involved 
with investment spending.  
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H2: For financially constrained restaurant chains, it is lower the positive 





 Investment Outcomes  
This study has argued that firms making investments when others retreat can pull 
ahead competitors, suggesting that uncertainty increases the strategic value of investments. 
The strategic value can be measured in the context of relative performance. Under 
imperfect competition, the commitment of an irreversible investment creates a preemptive 
effect, which is discouraging entrants and new investments of competitors, leading to a 
gain in market share (Gilbert, 1989). Market share reflects relative performance among 
firms and the competitive position of the focal firm within the particular industry. In an 
extreme case it is possible to record an increase in market share even when sales growth is 
negative if the entire industry suffers from decreasing demand. Market share is expressed 
as a fraction and is calculated as the firm’s sales revenue divided by the U.S. retail sales of 




                                                   Eq. 5.1   
101 
 
Another measure of investment effect is operating profit margin. Companies can 
take advantage of low investment costs in times of increasing uncertainty as the demand 
for investment dwindles. This cost-saving effect would manifest as a form of reduced 
depreciation expense, leading to an improved bottom line. However, because most firms 
adopt the accelerated-depreciation method (Jagels & Ralston, 2007), it would probably 
take time for the cost-saving effect to materialize.  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
                                Eq. 5.2   
 Financial Constraint 
Extant literature has relied on individual firm’s susceptibility to capital market 
imperfections as a classification scheme for financially constrained firms (Cleary, 2006). 
Whited-Wu (WW) index, proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), is a weighted sum of ratios 
to estimate the degree of external financing constraint. The higher the index, the more 
difficult the firms to obtain external financing.  
𝑊𝑊 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = −0.091 ×
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡




− 0.044 × 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠($𝑚𝑖𝑙)𝑖,𝑡) + 0.102






To test H1, the following models were created.  
𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                         Eq. 5.4               
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                  Eq. 5.5  
Then, the models were expanded to further consider the role of financial constraint.  
𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) +
𝛽5(𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6(𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 ×
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  
 Eq. 5.6     
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 ×
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑊𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
       Eq. 5.7  
MS is the market share; INV is the capital expenditure net of depreciation expenses divided 
by total assets in the previous period; UNCER is the industry-wide demand uncertainty; 
WW is the Whited-Wu index; PROF is the operating margin, which is operating income 
after depreciation over sales revenue; LEV is the long-term debt leverage over the total 
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assets; SIZE is the net sales revenue on a log scale; INDGR is the annual industry sales 
growth. The subscript i indexes firms, and t, time. To improve the normality of the series, 
the natural log-transformation was taken for the variables MS, INV, and UNCER. Along 
with the interaction models above, baseline and two-way interaction models were tested as 
well.  
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data indicated that the disturbance term 
is first-order autoregressive. Therefore, to address the unobserved firm-specific effects and 
the autocorrelation in error terms, the equations were estimated using fixed-effect 
regression with AR (1) disturbances (Baltagi & Wu, 1999).  
 
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the main variables. For descriptive 
purposes, natural (unlogged) numbers are reported for INV and UNCER. The average 
market share of restaurant chains is 0.3 percent. Even the largest is 5.5 percent, implying 
that the U.S. restaurant industry is highly fragmented among public chains and a number 
of local restaurants. On average, U.S. restaurant firms spend 7.7% of the amount of total 




Table 5.1 Summary statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MS 1562 0.003 0.007 0.00002 0.055 
PROF 1628 0.061 0.073 -0.261 0.264 
INV 1533 0.077 0.129 -0.101 0.645 
UNCER 1562 0.301 0.100 0.182 0.579 
WW  1537 0.396 0.092 0.145 0.597 
SIZE 1628 5.508 1.644 -.708 10.244 
LEV 1622 0.247 0.314 0 1.308 
INDGR 906 0.038 0.327 -2.103 1.181 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the pairwise correlation coefficients between variables. First 
of all, UNCER is negatively correlated with INV, as expected. The intriguing point is that 
UNCER has a positive association with market share (MS). Given that the sample firms are 
public restaurant chains, it can be interpreted as small, nonpublic restaurants are hit 
relatively harder by demand uncertainty than their large, public counterparts. The 
dampening effect of uncertainty on growth can be found in the negative correlation 
between UNCER and market share growth (∆MS). UNCER has a positive association with 
PROF. Though the results are not reported here, to identify the reason for this seemingly 
puzzling outcome, it was calculated the correlation between UNCER and gross margin, 
operating expense ratio, and depreciation expense ratio. The results showed that there is a 
negative correlation between UNCER and sales, general, and administrative expense ratio. 
What this indicates is that in the face of demand uncertainty restaurant firms cut their 
105 
 
marketing and administrative expenses first to protect the bottom line, consistent with 
previous research (Deleersnyder et al., 2009; Steenkamp & Fang, 2011).  
Table 5.2 Correlation matrix 
 UNCER INV MS ∆MS PROF WW LEV SIZE 
INV -0.260 
*** 













































































Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
The negative correlation between MS and INV suggests that large firms tend to 
spend a smaller fraction of their resources in investment. This can be explained by the 
fact that large and well-known restaurant chains are heavily engaged in franchising. 
Because it is franchisees who are mainly responsible for capital investment, franchisors 
exhibit a lower investment rate than nonfranchisors. Investment is positively correlated 
with the Whited-Wu index. The WW index has three components associated with 
leverage, liquidity, and dividend payment. Given that making investment inevitably 
entails cash outlay or issuance of new debt, it is not surprising to observe a positive 
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association between them. WW is negatively related to UNCER, indicating that it is more 
difficult to get access to external capital when the environment is uncertain. 
 
5.4.2 Main Results   
Table 5.3 reports the effects of uncertainty, investment, and financial constraint on 
market share. Panel A presents the test results of the two-way interaction between 
uncertainty and investment. As expected, INV has a positive but UNCER has a negative 
impact on market share. Consistent with H1, the interaction term is significantly positive, 
indicating that firms making investments in times of high uncertainty reach a larger market 
share than when they do in times of low uncertainty.  
In Panel B, the role of financial constraints is factored in. In column (3), the main 
effect of UNCER, INV, and financial constraint (WW) are examined. As expected, INV has 
a positive but UNCER and WW have a negative impact on market share. The negative 
coefficient of WW is in line with Chevalier and Scharfstein’s (1996) finding that during a 
recession financially constrained firms get cold feet for fear of default and lose market 
share to less-constrained firms. 
Two-way interaction model results are shown in column (4). Only the INV×UNCER 
has a positively significant coefficient. The three-way interaction term in the full model, 
shown in column (5), is negatively significant. Given that the WW measures the extent to 
which a firm is financially constrained, the negative coefficient means that the positive 




Table 5.3 Effects of investment, uncertainty and financial constraint on market share 
DV: Market Share Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INV 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.129*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
UNCER -0.418*** -0.358*** -0.560*** -0.525*** -0.547*** 
  (0.111) (0.113) (0.114) (0.124) (0.124) 
WW   -7.653*** -7.890***  -8.112*** 
    (0.897) (0.900) (0.908) 
INV×UNCER  0.164***  0.194*** 0.174*** 
   (0.057)  (0.065) (0.065) 
UNCER×WW    -1.140 -2.059* 
     (1.096) (1.186) 
WW×INV    0.014 0.041 
     (0.268) (0.267) 
INV×UNCER×WW     -1.596** 
     (0.788) 
PROF -3.819*** -3.545*** -6.486*** -5.922*** -5.919*** 
 (0.739) (0.759) (0.855) (0.865) (0.863) 
LEV -0.521** -0.508** -0.576** -0.539** -0.575** 
 (0.221) (0.223) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) 
INDGR -9.123*** -9.772*** -11.607*** -12.091*** -12.133*** 
  (1.169) (1.193) (1.316) (1.328) (1.324) 
cons -6.200*** -6.171*** -6.071*** -6.083*** -6.080*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
F-value 33.99*** 30.44*** 44.98*** 31.79*** 29.12*** 
obs 790 790 788 788 788 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 





Table 5.4 Effect of investment, uncertainty and financial constraint on profit margin 
DV: PROF Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INV 0.002* 0.002 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
UNCER 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
WW   0.051 0.032  0.041 
    (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
INV×UNCER  -0.007**  -0.008*** -0.008** 
   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
UNCER×WW    -0.032 0.002 
     (0.052) (0.056) 
WW×INV    -0.028** -0.029** 
     (0.013) (0.013) 
INV×UNCER×WW     0.058 
     (0.039) 
SIZE 0.004* 0.003 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
INDGR 0.076 0.097 0.072 0.097 0.100 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
cons 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
F-value 2.42** 3.06*** 2.89** 2.83*** 2.76*** 
obs 793 793 788 788 788 
Note: ***: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.05 level; *: significant at 0.1 level. 




In Table 5.4, the estimation results of Eq. 5.5 and 5.7 are reported. What attracts 
our attention is the negative coefficient of INV×UNCER in column (2). Fixed investment 
incurs depreciation expense, which is usually large at first and decreases over time 
according to the accelerated-depreciation method. When consumers refrain from dining 
out, a substantially increased depreciation expense from a new investment, combined with 
falling revenue, can hammer the bottom line. 
Panel B presents the three-way interaction model results. In column (4), in 
addition to INV×UNCER, WW×INV is also negatively related to PROF. This indicates 
that for financially constrained firms the positive impact of investment on profit margin is 
less than for less-constrained firms. When it comes to the three-way interaction effect, the 
negative moderating effect of uncertainty on the effectiveness of investment does not 
depend on the firm’s financial constraint status. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The final essay analyzes the financial implications of investment made under 
uncertainty. The results partially confirmed the hypotheses. There is a positive moderating 
effect of demand uncertainty on the investment’s impact on market share. That is, the firms 
undertaking investment under increasing uncertainty gain a larger market share than when 
the uncertainty level is relatively low. This shows that well-targeted investments can help 
firms turn crisis into opportunity to pull ahead of competitors who retreat in the face of 
uncertainty. However, as far as profit margin is concerned, making fixed investment in 
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times of high uncertainty appears to be detrimental to the bottom line. Regardless of sales 
volume, fixed assets incur depreciation expenses, which are usually high at the early stage 
of the useful life of the asset. Combined with dwindling sales, capital investment decreases 
the operating profit margin in the following year.     
Next, this study further considers the impact of financial constraint. Here, financial 
constraint indicates how difficult it is to obtain external financing. Construction and 
remodeling of restaurants usually require the commitment of sizable financial resources, 
and thus likely increase financial burden. Because of the increased financial risk involved 
with investment spending, it was hypothesized that the effectiveness of investment would 
be lower for financially constrained firms than for non-financially constrained firms. The 
findings reveal that for financially constrained firms, increasing investment when demand 
is uncertain results in a lower market share than for relatively less constrained firms. 
The findings provide several implications for practitioners. Considering the 
chances hidden in uncertain times as hinted by this study, they should develop strategies to 
find the opportunities and take advantage of tough times. Nevertheless, given that 
investment can hurt profit margins in uncertain times, managers should design investment 
plans in a way that can minimize the adverse impact of depreciation expenses on the profit 
rate. For example, to protect the profit margin from adverse shocks to sales, it is important 
to have a high proportion of variable costs relative to fixed costs. Because variable costs 
are linked to sales volume, the profit margin of companies with a high level of variable 
costs compared to fixed costs is generally less volatile (Jagels & Ralston, 2007). In this 
regard, designing a restaurant concept that has a relatively higher portion of variable costs 
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relative to fixed costs cannot only instill flexibility in the investment project but also 
preserve the profit margin. It is also recommended to find high-impact elements that can 
deliver a larger payoff. In addition, the management of financially vulnerable firms should 
carefully calculate direct and indirect costs of investment beforehand. Indirect costs include 
potential increased default risk and return of other options, such as reserving cash internally 
or investing in financial assets.   
Given that the data are from the U.S. restaurant industry, the results and discussions 
cannot be generalized without caution to other countries in different economic situations 
from the United States. For example, Japan had experienced an unprecedented long 
economic slump over two decades after the collapse of asset price bubbles within the 
Japanese economy. In such a prolonged depression being proactive may entail more risk 
and uncertainty, which might put the firms on the verge of default. Therefore, more studies 
performed in different countries are warranted to further investigate complex implications 
of the interplay between uncertainty, economy, and investment. 
For future studies, it is worthwhile to examine what causes a difference in a 
company’s stance on uncertainty. While some firms take aggressive actions for the future, 
other firms exhibit a passive and cautious movement in the face of the same degree of 
uncertainty. What drives them to behave differently? What are the long-term consequences? 
Answers to these questions would enhance our understanding of the restaurant firms’ 









Uncertainty arises when imperfect knowledge makes it difficult to predict the future 
(Beckman et al., 2004). The instability and unpredictability inherent in consumer taste and 
preferences renders “demand uncertainty” as a consistent “source of uncertainty” (March, 
1978). The competitive market nature, however, does not allow much room to control price 
in response to fluctuating demand, implying that the restaurant business is exposed to 
demand uncertainty. Indeed, the hospitality industry is known to have a high demand 
uncertainty (Dyer, Furr, & Lefrandt, 2014). Nevertheless, this issue has not received due 
attention from the hospitality field. As an attempt to investigate the impact of demand 
uncertainty in the restaurant industry, this study examines the implications of demand 
uncertainty for capital investment. 
The first essay investigated the effect of demand uncertainty on capital investment 
in the restaurant industry. Consistent with extant literature rooted in the concept of 
investment irreversibility and real option, the results confirmed a dampening impact of 
demand uncertainty on investment. Restaurant firms postpone fixed investments when it is 
hard to predict industry demand. 
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In addition, this study found that the relationship between uncertainty and investment is 
not a linear one as assumed by most previous empirical research. The significantly negative 
quadratic uncertainty term suggests that the influence of uncertainty is not constant but 
becomes more severe as the uncertainty rises. Both uncertainty terms, linear and quadratic, 
are significant even after controlling conventional determinants of investment, including 
Q, cash flows and industry and economy growth. Within the range of estimated uncertainty, 
it was further revealed that investment freezes more rapidly in periods of comparatively 
low GDP growth than in periods of high growth. In other words, uncertainties about 
demand is more detrimental to investment activities in recessionary periods when the 
margin for error is thin.    
After analyzing the general effect of uncertainty, it was examined how the effect 
interacts with industry-specific nature: franchising and segmentation. According to the 
results, franchising chains consistently invest less than nonfranchisors but there is no 
significant difference between the two groups in terms of the degree of the responsiveness 
of investment to uncertainty. When it comes to segment, full-service restaurants are more 
adversely affected by demand uncertainty than limited-service restaurants. This finding is 
in line with previous literature which argues that limited-service restaurant chains have a 
lower income elasticity of demand and thus outperform full-service counterparts in a lean 
economy. 
This study expands the realm of uncertainty-investment research, which has 
exclusively focused on manufacturing industries, into a service industry. Investment in the 
restaurant industry is unlike investment in the manufacturing industries. It is less lumpy 
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and split into multiple small projects as investment is implemented on a unit restaurant 
basis. The risk of irreversibility is lower as well. Such differences are presumed to cause a 
nonlinear association between uncertainty and investment. Except for a few studies (Bo & 
Lensin, 2005), most empirical research implicitly assumes a linear relationship even though 
several theoretical studies suggest the impact of uncertainty on investment is not monotonic 
(Abel & Eberly, 1999; French & Sichel, 1993; Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Sarkar, 2000). 
Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical argument of the previous 
studies and imply that the uncertainty-investment relationship should be understood in light 
of other factors, such as competition, strategic value of growth options, and the degree of 
irreversibility. 
The second study examined how restaurant firms behave under uncertainty. How 
do the managers make investment decisions in times of high uncertainty?  
It explored how restaurant firms cope with demand uncertainty when making investments. 
Although conventional investment rules argue that each investment project be evaluated 
based on its own profits and costs, this activity is usually not probable due to the bounded 
rationality of managers. In the absence of a clear imperative of what is efficient, managers 
are likely to scan other peers in the market and mimic their behavior. Moreover, when the 
market is fiercely competitive, managers would be more sensitive to peer competitors’ 
movement, not only to defend their customer base but also to achieve conformity.   
To test this idea, this study formed a peer sample comprised of quick service, fast 
casual, and casual dining chains. Consumers’ increasing needs for healthful quality foods 
at affordable prices have weakened the boundaries between the segments and made them 
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pursue similar strategies. Consistent with the hypotheses, sample restaurant firms appeared 
to be affected by peers in making investments. After controlling for traditional investment 
determinants, Q, cash flow, industry and economy growth, peer effect was still significant. 
The results further showed that as the demand uncertainty increases, that is, as it becomes 
more difficult to guarantee the profitability of an investment project, the more sample 
restaurant firms are inclined to follow peer investment behaviors. This indicates that 
uncertainty is a driving force that leads firms to follow peers.  
To verify what drives the mimicking investment behavior, additional tests were 
conducted. The findings show that either leaders or followers take into account the other’s 
investment activity when making investment decisions, indicating that the mimetic 
behavior does not work in one direction but rather in the bilateral direction between leaders 
and followers. This implies that the peer effect does not arise from learning or legitimacy-
seeking motives (of less successful firms), but rather from competitive motives.   
This essay reveals a human side of corporate investment decision. It shows that 
investment outlays are not simply determined by economic reasons, but are influenced by 
competitors’ actions. Under atomistic competition like the restaurant industry, each firm is 
expected neither to influence nor to be influenced by another firm (Hart, 1985; Wolinsky, 
1986). Campbell (2011) argues against this notion and demonstrates that strategic 
interactions lie at the heart of restaurant pricing and turnover. This study extends 
Campbell’s (2011) argument by showing that restaurant firms consider other peer firms in 
making investment decisions as well. Moreover, the fact that the peer effect is more 
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pronounced in periods of high uncertainty supplies evidence for the managers’ bounded 
rationality.  
Lastly, this study compared the investment outcomes between peer-sensitive and 
less-sensitive firms. According to the findings, capital expenditures of firms whose 
investment outlay is highly correlated with their peers are less effective in expanding 
market share than that of firms with a low correlation. Investments undertaken 
simultaneously would increase competition clutter, which can decrease the profitability of 
investment.   
In relation to this point, a word of caution is warranted for managers who consider 
basing their investment decisions on other firms. Every firm is situated differently in terms 
of products, resources, competitive advantages etcetera. Thus, before referring to other 
peers’ behavior, the firm must evaluate whether the investment plan is economically 
feasible and sustainable. As hinted by the aforementioned case of DavCo and Wendy’s, a 
roughly designed investment plan that does not go through a thorough test to ensure the 
long-term economic feasibility may cause negative outcomes.   
In the final piece of the dissertation, the effectiveness of investment made under 
uncertainty was analyzed. Extant research delving into the countercyclical effectiveness of 
investment, commonly warns against the backlash of cutback practices and predicts greater 
investment returns in the post-recession periods. Firms that actively search for 
opportunities in difficult times and make an aggressive investment can achieve superior 
performance afterwards. Inspired by this line of research, this study examined the financial 
implications of investment made under uncertainty. The results showed that a rise in 
117 
 
investment in times of high uncertainty leads to a larger market share. It shows that well-
targeted investments can help firms turn crisis into opportunity to get the jump on 
competitors. However, it also has to be noted that increased depreciation costs and 
dwindling sales can hurt the profit margin in uncertain times.   
Most research that deals with countercyclical value of investment focus on 
intangible investment, such as marketing and R&D. Now it has been shown that not only 
soft but also fixed investments have a similar effect. Moreover, this study discovered that 
investment effectiveness is moderated not only by the economic conditions but also by the 
degree of demand uncertainty. In addition, this study added one more layer of complexity, 
financial constraint. The findings suggest that although capital investments made under 
uncertainty generate greater returns, its association with the firm’s financial condition 
should also be considered. 
Taken together, the first and last essays suggest that uncertainty is not always a 
“bad” thing to be afraid of. As Sarkar (2000) points out, uncertainty depresses investment 
but it can also increase the probability that the investment threshold will be hit (Sarkar, 
2000). Indeed, the nonlinear relationship surfaced in this thesis implies that many 
restaurant firms increase investment for low levels of uncertainty. Hence, if demand 
uncertainty is low to moderate, managers should aggressively search for investment 
opportunities and carefully weigh the strategic value of investment against the hidden cost 
of investment (a form of flexibility) rather than merely waiting until the uncertainty 
subsides.   
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The current thesis is an early attempt to deal with demand uncertainty in the 
restaurant industry. This means that research on uncertainty in the foodservice industry is 
at the very beginning stage and there is much more to explore. A few research directions 
worthy of investigation include 1) estimating the exposure of firm value to industry 
uncertainty; 2) identifying the operational and financial characteristics of firms with greater 
vulnerabilities to uncertainty in order to suggest some practical hedging tactics for 
hospitality businesses; 3) verifying the determinants of industry and firm-level uncertainty, 
which would involve various factors, such as the economy, intra-industry competition, 
input price volatility, to name a few; and 4) developing different kinds of uncertainty 
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The list of restaurant chains used in Study 1 and 2 is presented below. Firm-year 




Back Yard Burgers Inc 
Burger King Worldwide Inc 
Carrols Restaurant Group Inc 
Checkers Drive-In Restaurant 
Cke Restaurants Inc 
Davco Restaurants Inc 
Domino's Pizza Inc 
Good Times Restaurants Inc 
Jack In The Box Inc 
Krystal Co 
Mcdonald's Corp 
Meritage Hospitality Group 
 
Morgans Foods Inc 
Nathan's Famous Inc 
Papa Johns International Inc 
Pj America Inc 
Rallys Hamburgers Inc 
Santa Barbara Restaurant Grp 
Sonic Corp 
Wendy's Co 
Wendy's International Inc 




Boston Chicken Inc 
Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc 
Cosi Inc 
Miami Subs Corp 
Panera Bread Co 
 
 
Pollo Tropical Inc 
Rubio's Restaurants Inc 
Schlotzsky's Inc 
Taco Cabana 




Mccormick & Schmicks Seafood 
Mortons Restaurant Group Inc 
 
Ruths Hospitality Group Inc 








Applebees Intl Inc 
Ark Restaurants Corp 
Avado Brands Inc 
Back Bay Restaurant Grp Inc 
Bayport Restaurant Gp 
Benihana Inc 
Bertuccis Inc 
Biglari Holdings Inc 
Bj's Restaurants Inc 
Bob Evans Farms 
Boston Restaurant Assoc Inc 
Bravo Brio Restaurant Gp Inc 
Brinker Intl Inc 
Buca Inc 
Buffalo Wild Wings Inc 
California Pizza Kitchen Inc 
Cec Entertainment Inc 
Champps Entmt Inc 
Cheesecake Factory Inc 
Chefs International Inc 
Cooker Restaurant/Oh 
Cracker Barrel Old Ctry Stor 
Cucos Inc 




El Chico Restaurants Inc 
Elephant & Castle Group Inc 
Elmer's Restaurants Inc 
Famous Daves Of America Inc 
Flanigans Enterprises Inc 
Fox & Hound Restaurant Group 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp 
Frisch's Restaurants Inc 
 
 
J. Alexander's Corp 
Jerrys Famous Deli Inc 
Kona Grill Inc 
Koo Koo Roo Inc 
Landrys Restaurants Inc 
Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon 
Lubys Inc 
Main Street Restaurant Group 
Max & Ermas Restaurants 
Mexican Restaurants Inc 
O'charley's Inc 
Osi Restaurant Partners Inc 
P F Changs China Bistro Inc 
Perkins Family Rests 
Phoenix Restaurant Group Inc 
Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc 
Rainforest Cafe Inc 
Rare Hospitality Intl Inc 
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers 
Roadhouse Grill Inc 
Rock Bottom Restaurants Inc 
Ruby Tuesday Inc 
Rudys Restaurant Group Inc 
Sbarro Inc 
Shoney's Inc 
Silver Diner Inc 
Skyline Chili Inc 
Spaghetti Warehouse Inc 
Summit Family Restaurnts Inc 
Texas Roadhouse Inc 
Timber Lodge Steakhouse Inc 
Uno Restaurant Corp 
Vicorp Restaurants Inc 
Worldwide Restaurant Concept 
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